I. Overview

This preliminary statement is offered by the international observation mission of the International Republican Institute (IRI) to Mozambique’s October 9, 2024, general and provincial assembly elections. The 40-person international delegation representing 20 countries is led by The Honorable Dr. Succès Masra, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Chad. The leadership team also comprised of IRI president, Dr. Daniel Twining, IRI Board Vice Chair Mr. Randy Scheunemann, and IRI Board Member and former Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Ms. Dana White.  The mission deployed observer teams to nine provinces and Maputo City.

Through this mission, IRI echoes the international community’s interest in, and support for, inclusive, transparent, accountable and peaceful elections in Mozambique. This statement includes an accurate and impartial assessment of the election process to date and offers practical recommendations to improve future elections.

The critical processes of results collation remain underway; neither provisional nor official results have been announced, and electoral challenges, if any, have yet to be adjudicated. In the immediate period following election day, IRI urges the CNE to conduct a fair, transparent, accurate and timely count of the results to ensure that Mozambican voters’ democratic desires are respected.

As the nation awaits results of the general and provincial assembly elections, IRI continues to observe the electoral process including the announcement of provisional and official results and the adjudication of disputes. At the conclusion of the process, IRI will issue a comprehensive final report.  

The mission conducted its activities in accordance with the laws of Mozambique and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and coordinated with other international and regional observer missions that endorse the Declaration. The mission is grateful for the cooperation it received from Mozambican citizens, the Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE), the Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral (STAE), government officials, candidates, party members, representatives from civil society and the journalists with whom it interacted.

II. Executive Summary 

On October 9, 2024, Mozambique held elections to select its next president, parliament, provincial assembly and governor. A total of 37 political organizations and four presidential candidates took part in the elections: Daniel Chapo of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front – FRELIMO), Ossufo Momade of Resistência Nacional Moçambican (Mozambican National Resistance – RENAMO), Lutero Simango of Movimento Democratico de Moçambique – Mozambique Democratic Movement – MDM) and Venâncio Mondlane (independent candidate).  

Despite challenges, the democratic spirit of the Mozambican people is strong. Mozambiquan citizens were not deterred from exercising their right to determine their future. Vibrant democracies require that citizens elect their leaders through a competitive, open, inclusive, and transparent process. The multi-party nature of this election, while still not optimal, represents an improvement in the opening of democratic space.

The pre-election period and election day was an opportunity for Mozambique to enact improvements to the electoral process and respond to the desires of its citizens, but it has, at least up to this point, fallen short of international standards. While interlocutors reported lower levels of election violence than in years past many of the issues raised in previous elections have not been sufficiently addressed, including inconsistent or late accreditation of domestic observers and party agents; late changes to the electoral legislation; reports of illegal use of state resources during the campaign period; vote buying; voter intimidation. These challenges diminish public confidence in the electoral process.

In the pre-election period, voter registration figures of 17 million exceeded the electoral population estimated by the Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (National Statistics Institute – INE), with seven of the eleven provincial departments registering more than population estimates particularly in FRELIMO strongholds.

 The process was criticized for recurrent power shortages for equipment, allegations that authorities deliberately delayed registration in opposition areas, and allegations of inflated number of voters in provinces favorable to the ruling party.

Changes to the electoral legislation were published late, less than seven weeks before election day. New amendments in electoral legislation remove the authority of district courts to order recounts or annul election results. The amendments, together with changes to the law related to the Constitutional Council’s authority, establish a direct link between the Constitutional Council and the district courts, without the intermediary of the Supreme Court, creating confusion and uncertainty among citizens over the adjudication of disputes.

The CNE faced difficulties in accessing funds for electoral preparations, the impact of which was most visible in the disbursement of public funds for the campaign and the payment of polling officials. The CNE/STAE missed the opportunity to deploy an effective public communication strategy that could have brought a higher level of understanding and transparency to the electoral process. Political parties faced challenges in accessing public funding to support their electoral campaigns as disbursements did not begin until August 15—over three weeks late. Only the incumbent party FRELIMO was able to robustly campaign in all provinces both through abuse of state resources and spending considerable sums on party paraphernalia than any other party.  

It was reported that FRELIMO frequently used state vehicles and closed schools for much of the campaign period whereby teachers and administrators were forced to campaign for the ruling party. Opposition parties also reported incidents of harassment and use of intimidation tactics that effectively curtailed campaigning.

At the start of election day, most polls opened on time according to procedure. Poll workers were commendably well-trained, and well-prepared, with the isolated exceptions of Nampula, Sofala, and parts of Maputo provinces where delayed openings were reported due to unpreparedness and/or the absence of polling station staff. Essential voting materials were widely available across most polling stations, and ballot boxes were properly sealed and visible. Party agents of FRELIMO, RENAMO, MDM, and PODEMOS, were observed at some polling stations. FRELIMO comprised most party agents while the other opposition parties struggled to receive accreditation with sufficient time to organize.  

There was significant representation of women among polling station staff. Overall, the voting environment remained peaceful, though Nampula, Niassa, and Zambezia experienced severe overcrowding and delays in opening. In some cases, tensions rose, with voters becoming agitated and overcrowded polling stations creating confusion and slow progress. For example, in Maputo city, the vote was stopped for about 30 minutes in a polling station due to tensions and overcrowding.

The mission noted a few incidents of critical violations across the country. In provinces such as Maputo, Niassa, Inhambane and Zambezia, political party agents and citizen observers were, at times, denied entry into polling stations. This occurred despite the citizen observers holding the necessary credentials, causing disruptions in observation efforts. Security personnel in locations such as Nampula and Niassa intimidated voters and observers.  That situation raised concerns about undue influence.

Closing and counting processes were orderly and party agents were present in polling stations where IRI observers were present, often working late into the night and with insufficient light. However, results collation and transmission processes lack sufficient transparency. The inconsistent availability of publicly accessible polling station level results forms continues to undermine citizen confidence in the CNE at a crucial moment of the electoral process. In addition, the lengthy timelines for sharing results – up to 15 days – creates space for actors to question the legitimacy of the process, which in turn undermines the credibility of the process.

Lastly, the mission also noted with grave concern reports of persistent delays in the accreditation which significantly impeded the ability to adequately field sufficient party agents and observers on election day. Unprecedented requirements for some international observers’ visas created unnecessary confusion, restricted observers’ timely arrival to Mozambique and raised questions about the government’s commitment to international standards to which it accedes including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Human Rights which oblige endorsers to create a conducive environment for monitoring elections.

Key Recommendations

In the spirit of more effective international cooperation, the mission offers the following 11 key recommendations that can be implemented to enhance transparent, credible and inclusive electoral processes in Mozambique:

Strengthening Independent Institutions and Combatting Misuse of State Resources

• Strengthen the CNE’s budgetary independence through direct and timely access to the funds approved in the National General Budget, avoiding that the release of funds for the conduct of the elections, including the public financing for campaign activities, is dependent on the government.
• To avoid confusion, authorities should ensure amendments to the electoral law are published well in advance of election day.
• State institutions should enforce the existing prohibition on the misuse of state resources to ensure that governing authorities do not abuse their incumbent position to utilize public assets or mobilize civil servants for political campaign purposes.

Improving Election Administration

• The CNE should make efforts to reduce the time necessary for counting at the various administrative levels, and subsequent announcement of presidential results from the current 15 days.
• The CNE should release and publish polling, district, and provincial level results in an open data format that is searchable consistent with international principles for open data.
• The CNE and STAE should ensure timely accreditation to party agents and citizen observers, ensuring their unfettered access to polling centers and condemning intimidation and physical harassment of citizen observers according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
• The CNE should ensure the tender process for procuring election-related materials is done through an open, competitive, and transparent process to build voter confidence and safeguard against corrupt practices. 
• To improve the integrity of the voter roll, consideration should be given to a permanent voter register with updates on election years.
• The CNE should ensure voters have the opportunity to confirm in advance that their name is on the voters’ list in their assigned polling station.

Promoting Inclusive Elections

• The CNE should continue to promote inclusive practices for the participation of vulnerable groups, especially ensuring access to polling stations for persons with disabilities.
• Political parties should adopt internal democratic processes to ensure women and underrepresented groups can play an active role in party structures and campaigning.

The mission stresses that the critical processes of tabulating remain underway and neither provisional nor official results have been announced. The mission urges the CNE to conduct a fair, transparent, accurate and timely count of the results to ensure the will of the people is respected.

III. Political Context

The 2024 presidential election was an open contest with no incumbent in the race. Candidates also competed for 250 parliamentary seats and ten provincial assembly seats. Provincial governors will be elected for the second time, one of RENAMO’s key demands for decentralized governance.

These general elections took place against the backdrop of the 2023 municipal elections which were marked by an uneven political playing field and continued lack of confidence in electoral institutions that led to disputes over validity of results and weeks of street protests. Internal disputes within the main opposition party resulted in the rise of a new political dynamic that disrupts the status quo.

Opposition coalitions struggle to have any significant influence owing to ruling party manipulation of the laws, electoral administration, and judicial pressure. Growing citizen discontent, particularly in urban areas, has increased support to opposition parties; however, FRELIMO’s dominance over state institutions provides an unfair advantage and ability to manipulate laws and policies in their favor, providing an uneven playing field for political competition.

IV. Summary of Initial Findings

Amendments to the electoral legislation were published in the Official Gazette on August 23, less than seven weeks before election day. These amendments stemmed from debates surrounding the jurisdiction of district courts during the 2023 municipal elections, when the Constitutional Council overturned district court decisions to re-run elections, ruling that these courts lacked the authority to annul elections and could only order recounts.

The new provisions have been criticized for diminishing the role of district courts by removing their power to order recounts or annul election results. Along with an amendment to the organic law governing the Constitutional Council’s powers and operations, approved in May 2024, the new legislation establishes a direct link between the Constitutional Council and district courts, bypassing the Supreme Court. However, the constitutionality of these legal changes has been questioned within the judicial community.

Voter Registration

Around 17 million voters were registered to participate in the 2024 elections, surpassing the estimated electoral population provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (National Statistics Institute – INE). Notably, seven of the 11 provincial departments reported registration rates exceeding 100 percent of the estimated population.  The inflated figures were attributed to outdated data from the National Statistics Office and the appeal of the voter card, as it is free and often serves as a substitute for an ID card. Also noteworthy is the fact that citizens may demonstrate their identity with testimony from two witnesses, and registration officials cannot refuse registration.

The voter registration process was criticized for recurrent power shortages that affected equipment, allegations that authorities deliberately delayed registration in opposition areas and inflated the number of voters in provinces favorable to the ruling party. However, opposition political parties did not challenge voter registration numbers as their focus was concentrated on their internal politics.

Candidate Nomination

A total of 37 political organizations took part in the parliamentary and provincial assembly elections. Four candidates were approved by the Constitutional Council to stand in the presidential election: Daniel Chapo of FRELIMO, Ossufo Momade of RENAMO, Lutero Simango representing the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (Mozambican Democratic Movement – MDM), and Venâncio Mondlane who secured the necessary 20,000 endorsing signatures. Seven other candidates were disqualified due to irregularities and/or incomplete nomination papers. Lutero Simango, Daniel Chapo, and Venâncio Mondlane were first-time presidential candidates.

The exclusion of Coligação Aliança Democrática (Democratic Alliance Coalition – CAD) in a process that lacked consensus within the judicial community was perceived as an attempt by competing parties to neutralize a potential competitor using the electoral management bodies.

Election Administration

Mistrust between the main political parties led to an overly complex electoral administration structure, with the main parties filling the positions at all levels with political appointees who may have lacked the necessary technical expertise.

The CNE has faced ongoing criticism for poor public communication and engagement with electoral stakeholders. To date, the CNE/STAE has not implemented a more effective public communication strategy that could bring a higher level of transparency to the electoral process. Their communication with the public has been limited to sporadic press conferences for ceremonial events or calls for peaceful elections, or to draw attention to the electoral administration’s lack of financial resources. The CNE/STAE website and Facebook pages neither contain updated information nor include the most recent CNE deliberations or decisions, preventing timely dissemination of information to stakeholders.

In the weeks leading up to the election, several incidents raised concerns about the independence and credibility of the electoral institutions.  These include an allegation by the RENAMO-appointed vice president of the CNE that the decision to use ballot boxes from previous elections had not been approved in a plenary session; and the complaint filed by RENAMO in Quelimane (Zambézia province), which led to the invalidation of the recruitment process after a last-minute notice from the STAE. In both cases, the CNE and the STAE did not provide further clarification.

The CNE also faced challenges accessing funds for electoral preparations, which was most evident in the delayed disbursement of public funds for campaign financing and the payment of polling officials. The failure to disburse election related funding also affected the Mozambique Republic Police (PRM), which is responsible for election security.

Campaign Period

The campaign period was marked by an unequal playing field, with FRELIMO dominating the process. FRELIMO visibly benefited greatly from incumbency, using state resources and enjoying more media coverage than other parties. In addition to material public resources such as state vehicles, there were several cases of pressure on teachers and public administration employees to join FRELIMO campaign activities, specifically the use of principals to lead campaign brigades.

FRELIMO had far more financial resources for campaigning compared to other parties, spending large sums on paid media airtime, public advertising, and party materials. The resources allocated to the presidential candidate’s campaign far surpassed those of any opposition candidate. According to the law, public funds for campaigning should be transferred to political parties at least 21 days before the campaign period begins. However, the disbursement of these funds did not start until August 15, just nine days before the campaign’s official start.

Legal Framework

Amendments to the electoral legislation were published in the Gazette on August 23, less than seven weeks before election day. These amendments stemmed from the debates surrounding the jurisdiction of the district courts during the 2023 municipal elections, when the Constitutional Council overturned district court decisions to re-run elections, ruling that these courts lacked the authority to annul elections and could only order recounts.

The new provisions have been criticized for diminishing the role of the district courts by removing their power to order recounts or annual election results. Along with an amendment to the organic law governing the Constitutional Council’s powers and operations, approved in May 2024, the new legislation establishes a direct link between the Constitutional Council and district courts, bypassing the Supreme Court. However, the constitutionality of these legal changes has been questioned within the judicial community.

Party agents and National Observers

The legal provisions establish clear requirements for accreditation and the rights and obligations of observers. Despite the law establishing a five-day period for provincial election commissions to grant accreditation after submitting their request, some domestic observer groups faced difficulties in obtaining accreditation, with provincial election commissions, namely in Zambezia, claiming technical problems with the equipment as an excuse not to issue accreditations. Opposition parties faced difficulties in obtaining timely accreditation for their Agents.

Election Day

Polls opened mostly on time and according to procedures. Observers noted that in general most polling stations did open on time and according to according to administrative procedures. Polling station staff were well-trained and professional throughout the day. While most polling stations had adequate staff, in a few instances scrutiny officers were missing, particularly in Tete and Niassa.

Positively, there was a strong presence of women among the polling staff, reflecting gender inclusion among personnel. Additionally, nearly all polling stations were well-prepared with the necessary voting materials, and the ballot boxes were locked, sealed, and visible. However, in certain areas, such as Zambezia, Niassa, Gaza, and Maputo provinces, accessibility for voters with reduced mobility was insufficient. Proper procedures for voter identification were followed, and the layout of the polling stations effectively maintained the secrecy of the vote. However, a key shortcoming was the lack of assistance for disadvantaged voters, as 70 percent of polling stations observed did not provide support for those in need of aid, particularly visually impaired voters.

Citizen observers were actively present in 68 percent of polling stations observed, while international election observers were present in 22 percent. Political party agents from major political groups, including FRELIMO, RENAMO, MDM and PODEMOS, were present in some polling stations though the overwhelming majority of party agents in polling stations were FRELIMO agents. Overall, voting proceeded smoothly in general, though instances of overcrowding and tension were reported in 32 percent of polling stations observed, particularly in the provinces of Zambezia, Niassa, and Sofala.

Counting and Closing

The ballot counting process was generally orderly, with most political party agents signing the results forms. This ensured that stakeholders were involved in the verification of the count. Copies of the election result forms were provided to most party agents. In the polling stations where the mission observed the closing and counting process in the province of Tete, polling staff did not communicate immediately the results to the District Electoral Commission. Nor did they consistently display results forms publicly outside the polling stations, raising concerns about the transparency and accuracy of the count. However, the presence of citizen and international observers during the counting process in several polling units helped to maintain oversight and reinforce the integrity of the proceedings.

Critical Violations

The mission reported 13 critical incidents across the country In provinces such as Maputo, Niassa, Inhambane and Zambezia, political party agents and observers were denied entry into polling stations. This occurred despite the observers holding the necessary credentials, causing disruptions in observation efforts.

In Nampula, a female election official was caught with FRELIMO ballots, potentially intending to engage in ballot stuffing. This incident could undermine the integrity of the election process. Several polling stations in Nampula, Niassa, and Zambezia experienced severe overcrowding and delays in opening. In some cases, tensions rose, with voters becoming agitated and overcrowded polling stations creating confusion and slow progress. In Maputo city, the vote was stopped for about 30 minutes in a polling unit due to tensions, overcrowding and unrest. Security personnel in locations such as Nampula and Niassa intimidated voters and observers. Some armed police officers were even stationed at polling units. That situation raised concerns about undue influence.

In Inhambane, the mission witnessed a conflict between the municipal president and the police director over the election process, resulting in misinformation and police intervention, which led to confusion among voters.

About the Mission

Since 1983, IRI has deployed 158 international election observation in more than 70 countries. The IRI observation mission for the October 9^th general elections conducted its activities in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, which was launched in 2005 at the United Nations. It also considered international and regional electoral standards, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

IRI continues to monitor the electoral process including the announcement of provisional and official results and the adjudication of disputes. At the conclusion of the process, IRI will issue a comprehensive final report.  

The delegation’s work was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Declaração Preliminar Eleições Gerais e das Assembleias Provinciais de 2024 em Moçambique

I. Introdução

Esta declaração preliminar é produzida pela missão de observação eleitoral do Instituto Republicano Internacional (IRI) para as eleições gerais e das assembleias provinciais de 9 de Outubro de 2024. A delegação composta por 40 membros representando 20 países é liderada por Sua Excelência Dr. Succès Masra, antigo Primeiro-Ministro da República do Chad. A liderança da missão é também composta pelo Presidente do IRI Dr. Daniel Twining, pelo Vice-Presidente do Conselho de Administração Sr. Randy Scheunemann, e a antiga Assistente para Relações Públicas do Secretário de Defesa dos Estados Unidos e Membro do Conselho de Administração, Sr.ª Dana White.  A missão destacou equipas de observadores para nove províncias e para a cidade de Maputo.

Através desta missão, o IRI ecoa o interesse da comunidade internacional e o apoio para a realização de eleições inclusivas, transparentes, responsáveis e pacificas em Moçambique. Esta declaração inclui uma análise precisa e imparcial do processo eleitoral até ao momento e oferece recomendações para a melhoria de futuros processos eleitorais.

O critico processo de apuramento de resultados eleitorais está a decorrer; nem resultados provisórios nem oficiais foram anunciados; e o contencioso eleitoral, se existir, ainda está por iniciar. No período imediatamente a seguir ao dia  eleitoral, o IRI insta a CNE para que o apuramento de resultados seja realizado de forma justa, transparente, precisa e atempada assegurando que as ambições democráticas dos  eleitores moçambicanos sejam respeitadas.

Enquanto o país espera pelos resultados das eleições presidenciais, parlamentares e das assembleias provinciais, o IRI continua a acompanhar o processo eleitoral incluindo a declaração de resultados quer provisórios quer definitivos e o possível contencioso eleitoral. No final do processo, o IRI publicará um relatório final.

A missão desempenhou as suas atividades de acordo com as leis de Moçambique e a Declaração de Princípios para a Observação Eleitoral Internacional e coordenou com outras missões de observação internacionais e regionais que subscrevem a referida Declaração. A missão agradece a cooperação recebida pelos cidadãos moçambicanos, a Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE), o Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral (STAE), membros do governo, candidatos, membros dos partidos, representantes da sociedade civil e jornalistas.

II.   Principais Conclusões 

A 9 de Outubro de 2024 os moçambicanos foram às urnas para escolher o seu próximo presidente, membros da Assembleia da República, das assembleias provinciais e governadores. Um total de 37 organizações políticas e quatro candidatos presidenciais participaram nas eleições: Daniel Chapo da Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), Ossufo Momade da Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), Lutero Simango do Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM) e Venâncio Mondlane. 

Apesar dos desafios, o espírito democrático do povo moçambicano é forte. Os moçambicanos não se abstiveram de exercer o seu direito a determinar o seu futuro. Democracias vibrantes requerem que os cidadãos elejam os seus lideres através de um processo competitivo, aberto, inclusivo e transparente. A natureza multi-partidária desta eleição, mesmo não sendo ótima, representa uma melhoria na abertura do espaço democrático.

O período pré-eleitoral e o dia das eleições constituíram uma oportunidade para Moçambique introduzir melhorias ao processo eleitoral e responder às ambições dos seus cidadãos, no entanto, até ao momento, tem sido um processo que está aquém dos parâmetros internacionais. Apesar de ter sido registado um menor nível de violência eleitoral comparativamente com anos anteriores, muitas das questões levantadas em processos eleitorais anteriores não foram resolvidas incluindo a inconstante e tardia acreditação de observadores nacionais e delegados de candidatura; alterações tardias à legislação eleitoral; registo de uso ilegal de recursos públicos durante a campanha eleitoral; compra de votos; e casos de intimidação de eleitores. Estes desafios diminuem a confiança dos cidadãos no processo eleitoral.

No período pré-eleitoral, os dados do recenseamento eleitoral equivalentes a mais de 17 milhões de eleitores excederam a população eleitoral estimada pelo Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE), com sete dos onze círculos eleitorais a registar mais de 100 por cento. O processo foi criticado por recorrentes cortes de energia, alegações de que as autoridades deliberadamente atrasaram o recenseamento em áreas da oposição e alegações de números inflacionados nas províncias mais favoráveis ao partido no governo.

Alterações à legislação eleitoral foram publicadas tardiamente, menos de sete Semanas antes das eleições. As alterações à legislação eleitoral removeram a autoridade dos tribunais distritais sobre recontagens e invalidação de resultados eleitorais. Estas alterações, juntamente com outras introduzidas na lei orgânica do Conselho Constitucional, estabeleceram uma ligação direta entre o Conselho Constitucional e os tribunais judiciais de distrito, sem a necessidade da intervenção do Tribunal Supremo, originando alguma confusão e incerteza entre os cidadãos sobre o contencioso eleitoral.

A CNE enfrentou dificuldades em aceder aos fundos destinados às operações eleitorais cujo impacto foi mais visível na atribuição do financiamento público para a campanha eleitoral e no pagamento aos funcionários eleitorais. A CNE e o STAE perderam uma oportunidade em adotar uma estratégica de comunicação pública que trouxesse um maior nível de esclarecimento e de transparência ao processo eleitoral.

Os partidos políticos enfrentaram desafios em aceder ao financiamento público para apoiar a sua campanha eleitoral uma vez que este foi disponibilizado apenas a 15 de Agosto, quase duas semanas depois. Somente a FRELIMO foi capaz de organizar uma campanha eleitoral em todas as províncias onde foi visível a utilização de recursos do estado, assim como consideráveis gastos com a compra de material de campanha, ao contrário de outros partidos políticos. Durante quase todo o período de campanha eleitoral, foram registados casos de uso frequente por parte da FRELIMO de veículos do estado e o encerramento de escolas forçando os professores e diretores a participar nas campanhas do partido no poder. Os partidos da oposição reportaram casos de perturbação e intimidação que efetivamente limitaram as suas atividades de campanha eleitoral.

No inicio do dia eleitoral, a maioria das mesas de votação abriram à hora prevista. Os membros das mesas de votação (MMVs) foram  qualificados como estando bem formados e bem preparados, com algumas exceções em Nampula, Sofala e em algumas zonas na província de Maputo, onde atrasos na abertura ficaram a dever-se a uma má preparação e/ou à ausência dos MMVs. Os materiais de votação foram disponibilizados por todo o país na maioria das mesas de votação e as urnas estavam devidamente seladas e visíveis. Delegados dos partidos políticos, nomeadamente FRELIMO, RENAMO, MDM e PODEMOS estiveram presentes em algumas mesas de votação. Enquanto a maioria dos delegados de candidatura eram da FRELIMO, outros partidos da oposição enfrentaram dificuldades em receber atempadamente as acreditações afetando a sua capacidade de organização.

Registou-se uma presença significativa de mulheres como membros de mesa de votação. No geral, o ambiente de votação manteve-se pacifico, apesar de Nampula, Niassa e Zambézia terem reportado multidões e atrasos na abertura das mesas. Em alguns casos, a tensão aumentou e os eleitores ficaram agitados, causando confusão e um progresso lento nas mesas sobrelotadas ao mesmo tempo que as mesas de votação lotadas originaram confusão e um progresso lento. Por exemplo, na cidade de Maputo, a votação parou durante cerca de 30 minutos numa mesa de votação devido à tensão e sobrelotação.

A missão notou alguns incidentes sobre violações por todo o país. Em províncias como Maputo, Niassa, Inhambane e Zambézia, delegados dos partidos políticos e observadores nacionais viram a sua entrada recusada nas mesas de votação. Isto ocorreu apesar dos observadores nacionais terem consigo a sua respetiva acreditação, causando perturbações aos esforços feitos para a observação eleitoral. Em locais como Nampula e Niassa foram registados casos em que oficiais da polícia intimidaram eleitores e observadores levantando preocupações sobre influência exercida indevidamente sobre estas pessoas.

O encerramento e o processo de apuramento parcial foi levado a cabo de forma ordeira e os delegados de candidatura estavam presentes nas mesas de votação onde os observadores do IRI observaram o apuramento parcial, o qual prolongou-se até de madrugada. No entanto, o processo de apuramento de resultados e de transmissão dos mesmos não reuniu níveis aceitáveis de transparência. A falha em disponibilizar os resultados eleitorais por mesa de votação numa plataforma acessível para escrutínio público ou de qualquer outra forma, desde que disponível ao público continua a afetar negativamente a confiança dos cidadãos na CNE num momento crucial do processo eleitoral. Para além disto, os longos prazos para a divulgação de resultados – até 15 dias – abre espaço para questionamentos sobre a legitimidade do processo, o que por sua vez afeta a credibilidade do processo eleitoral.

Por último, a missão também notou com preocupação os relatos sobre atrasos persistentes na emissão de acreditação aos delegados de candidatura e aos observadores nacionais, o que constituiu um impedimento à sua capacidade de adequadamente destacar suficientes números no dia eleitoral. Requisitos sem precedentes impostos a alguns observadores internacionais originaram uma confusão desnecessária, atrasou significativamente a data de chegada a Moçambique e levantou questões sobre o compromisso do governo com instrumentos internacionais como a Carta Africana sobre Democracia, Eleições e Direitos Humanos. 

No espírito de cooperação internacional, a missão oferece as seguintes 11 recomendações que podem aumentar os níveis de transparência, credibilidade e de inclusão dos processos eleitorais em Moçambique:

Fortalecimento de Instituições Independentes e Combate ao Uso Indevido dos Recursos do Estado

• Fortalecimento da independência orçamental da CNE através de acesso direto e atempado aos fundos aprovados pelo orçamento de Estado, evitando que o desembolso dos fundos para a realização das eleições esteja dependente do governo.
• As autoridades devem assegurar-se que as alterações à legislação eleitoral são publicadas com bastante antecedência ao dia eleitoral.
• As instituições públicas devem reforçar a atual proibição sobre o uso indevido de recursos do estado evitando que funcionários do governo não abusem da sua posição para utilizar recursos públicos e mobilizar funcionários públicos para atividades de campanha eleitoral.

Melhoria da Administração Eleitoral

• A CNE deverá tomar medidas para reduzir o tempo necessário para os vários níveis de apuramento e a subsequente declaração de resultados das eleições presidenciais que atualmente é de 15 dias.
• A CNE deverá disponibilizar e publicar os resultados do apuramento parcial, distrital e provincial num formato em que os dados possam ser consultados de acordo com os princípios internacionais de verificação de dados.
• A CNE e o STAE devem assegurar a acreditação atempada dos delegados de candidatura e dos observadores nacionais assegurando um acesso livre de impedimentos às assembleias de voto e condenando a intimidação e atentados à integridade física dos observadores de acordo com a Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos.
• A CNE deverá assegurar que o concurso público para a aquisição de materiais eleitorais é levado a cabo através de um processo aberto, competitivo e transparente fortalecendo a confiança do eleitor e salvaguardando o processo contra práticas corruptas.
• Para assegurar a integridade do recenseamento eleitoral deverá considerar-se a adoção de um recenseamento eleitoral permanente com atualizações nos anos eleitorais.
• A CNE deverá asseguar que os eleitores têm a oportunidade de verificar antecipadamente se o seu nome consta da lista de eleitores da mesa onde se recensearam.

Promovendo Eleições Inclusivas

• A CNE deverá continuar a promover práticas inclusivas para a participação de grupos vulneráveis.
• Os partidos políticos deverão adotar processos internos democráticos assegurando que mulheres e grupos pouco representados podem desempenhar um papel ativo nas estruturas partidárias e na campanha eleitoral.

A missão reitera que o critico processo de apuramento está a decorrer e que não foram declarados resultados provisórios ou oficiais. A missão insta a CNE a assegurar um apuramento de resultados justo, transparente, preciso e expedito de forma a assegurar que a vontade popular seja respeitada. O IRI continuará a observar o processo e poderá vir a fazer declarações posteriores.

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