wh y w e l o s t
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cized the broad, coalition government, but their rhetoric was different. While
Smer
re-
jected the liberal socio-economic policy of the cabinet in principle and behaved as an anti-
reform populist party, ANO criticized Dzurinda’s government for the way it carried out its
reform policy (i.e. particularism and corruption), but did not reject the reforms, as such.
Although opinion polls conducted in 2000 and 2001 indicated a significant decrease in
electoral support for the ruling center-right parties, these parties succeeded in keeping the
basic core of their voters. Shortly before elections, the support of the center-right parties
strengthened as a result of their ability to effectively reach citizens with their message.
VII. A CENTER-RIGHT GOVERNMENT
OF REFORMS AFTER 2002
The results of the parliamentary elections in 2002 could be considered an indisputable
success for center-right parties. It seemed that common governance of center-right and
left parties from 1998–2002 resulted in the weakening of the post-Communist left. It also
seems to have strengthened the center-right parties’ positions, allowing them to continue
the reforms they began after the 1998 elections.
Center-right parties – the SDKÚ, KDH, SMK and ANO – won almost 43% of the vote in 2002
and quickly organized a center-right coalition. Although in the pre-election period ANO was
often critical of the Dzurinda cabinet’s performance, the party realized that the new political
environment demanded a unified policy program and decided to join the coalition.
SMK’s success was more-or-less expected due to its stable support among the Hungarian
electorate. The electoral gains of newly established ANO were not a surprise either, thanks
to strong support from the very popular television station and the distance the party took
from some unpopular steps of Dzurinda’s cabinet. But the solid election gain of SDKÚ
and KDH, a major component of the ruling coalition, surprised many.
Both parties benefited from their quick reform of Mečiar-era mistakes and the renewal
of integration hopes of the country in 1998-1999. SDKÚ worked effectively to use a Eu-
roatlantic-integration theme and emphasized the necessity to preserve the basic trends in
the country’s development in order to join the EU and NATO. Although in 1998–2002
the struggle for democracy was an issue of declining importance, the argument about the
necessity to make the final break with Mečiarism was used effectively by the SDKÚ and
Dzurinda to influence voters.
Another positive factor for the SDKÚ and KDH was a relatively stable socio-economic
situation, as well as positive assessments of the economy by numerous international in-
stitutions. The SDKÚ interpreted this fact as a vindication of its reform policy. One of
the reasons for SDKÚ’s good election result, which was higher than its rating in opinion
polls, was the decision of DS to step down from the elections a few days prior to voting.
DS recommended that its supporters vote for SDKÚ, bringing an additional 2-3% of votes.
This may have helped SDKÚ win second place after the HZDS. Thus SDKÚ surpassed
Smer
, which performed much more poorly than its pre-election scores suggested, and
was officially entrusted with cabinet formation, after the HZDS failed due to its inability
to find a coalition partner. The center-right parties’ ability to comfortably discuss a variety
