Why We Lost - page 124

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C e n t e r - R i gh t Pa rt i e s i n S l o va k i a…
socio-economic changes. Strong supporters of preserving the common Czechoslovak
state unanimously supported a policy of economic reforms, while proponents of other
alternatives to the Czechoslovak state model opposed reform policies. They argued that
the policies were harmful to Slovakia, and that they were a result of Slovakia’s submissive
position within the Czechoslovak state.
In the years 1991-1992, several important changes took place in Slovakia’s party system.
The most important was that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) split from
VPN and stood against the VPN’s reform policies. The HZDS employed national and so-
cial populism and presented itself as the bearer of an alternative concept for the state
model, championing the blurred idea of introducing Slovakia’s national sovereignty into
the Czechoslovak arrangement. HZDS had been gaining a relatively strong level of sup-
port from the population and became a dominant political force.
Before the second free elections in 1992, the political landscape was divided and defined
by certain crucial, fundamental issues, especially the questions regarding socio-eco-
nomic reforms and the nature of the relationship between the Czech state and Slovakia.
Center-right ruling parties – that is the ODÚ (i.e. the rump VPN that transformed it-
self into a right-of-center democratic political formation after the separation of HZDS),
KDH and DS – supported the “federal” economic reforms and preservation of the com-
mon Czechoslovak state. KDH, which had not completely refused the idea of Slovakia’s
sovereignty, claimed that it was not the appropriate time for independence, and that the
common Czechoslovak state was more advantageous for Slovakia. Hungarian political
parties (MKDH and Coexistence) shared attitudes similar to those of the center-right
ruling parties. These parties were not members of the government coalition. They did,
however, supported socio-economic reform policies and were loyal to the Czechoslovak
state.
HZDS refused the “federal” economic reforms and was against the preservation of the
Czechoslovak federation in its then-current form. Although this party did not openly
speak about the declaration of full state independence, its ambiguous and unrealistic sug-
gestions about the further coexistence of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic (confed-
eration or union) created a favorable atmosphere for the division of Czechoslovakia. The
Slovak National Party (SNS), a party of radical nationalists, unanimously refused “federal”
economic reform, as well as maintenance of the common Czechoslovak state. The SNS,
which openly asked for a declaration of national independence, was the strongest party
of the separatist camp. The post-Communist SDĽ refused “shock therapy,” yet rejected
Slovak separatism and supported the preservation of the common state.
Opinion polls confirmed that it was HZDS that was gaining ground with its critical views
on the reform policy of the first non-Communist government and by its somewhat un-
clear stance on the issue of an appropriate state model. It became clear that this party
was going to receive substantial voter support in the upcoming elections. The civic-right
democratic parties had weaker public support and were unable to create any pre-election
alliances that would guarantee them seats in parliament.
On the center-right, only the KDH and the Hungarian MKDH-Coexistence coalition made
it to parliament in 1992 as a result of dissatisfaction with the results of the initial reforms, the
wave of nationalism that was triggered by the separatist forces and the inability of civic-right
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