wh y w e l o s t
114
The Democrats were always concerned about their popularity in the polls, and the polls
showed a constant drop. They were afraid that PDSR in the opposition would gain politi-
cal capital and legitimize itself as the only authentic social democratic party in Romania.
PDSR was not member of the Socialist International at that time because it was consid-
ered hard-line Communist. But it made an effort to change this image and to become a
modern social-democratic party, succeeding in 2001 when it merged with other smaller
social democratic groups to become the Social Democratic Party. Parallel to this process,
at the end of the CDR-led government’s term, PD became more and more anxious to
moderate economic reforms and provide social benefits for the poor so as to preserve its
own identity.
Shock therapy in the economy was only partially successful, but it was at least something.
In 2000, because some of the ineffective and/or parasitic industrial plants had been shut
down or privatized and subsidies had been eliminated, the economy started to recover.
After three years of economic decline, the year 2000 was the first year of tenuous eco-
nomic growth. A technocrat and former head of the national bank, Mugur Isarescu, was
appointed prime minister, which assured some sort of equilibrium in the coalition. At
the end of 1999, Romania was invited to start negotiations on EU integration, which was
a major victory, but mostly a political one, since from many other perspectives Romania
was not prepared for such a huge leap forward.
The economic reforms would have gone even further, had the government coalition not
been such a melting pot of ideologies and interests. The Christian Democrats and the
Civic Alliance wanted to promote moral reform. The Liberals were concerned more with
economic restructuring. The Democrats wished to preserve their identity and provide re-
lief for those among the population in need. The Hungarians had their own ethnic agenda,
which had nothing to do with economic issues. All parties pushed for their individual
interests, fears and concerns, while coordination was badly needed. Even worse, since all
partners shared governing responsibilities, ideology clashes were often transposed into
institutional quarrels.
The partners also found themselves in several situations prisoners of an imperfect consti-
tution. At the end of 1999, the coalition and the president discovered that it was impossi-
ble to remove the premier without changing the whole cabinet and without going through
the parliament at the mercy of the opposition. After long and embarrassing negotiations
with the prime minister at that time, Radu Vasile, they succeeded in forcing him to resign.
The president himself realized on several occasions that he had no political support for
his actions. Once endorsed by the Democratic Convention to win the presidency, Con-
stantinescu had thereafter no such political force on which to rely. The unofficial creed of
the 2000 election year was “everyone for himself.” Every party in the coalition attempted
to rescue the political capital it may have had left. PD had its own candidate for the presi-
dency, so had the Liberals, the Hungarians and the Christian Democrats. President Con-
stantinescu decided not to run for president again, which was a real loss, especially for the
Christian Democrats.
