wh y w e l o s t
        
        
          72
        
        
          I. INTRODUCTION
        
        
          H
        
        
          istorical events have hardly been favorable to the interests of the Macedonian
        
        
          nation and to the cause of an independent Macedonian state. Even now, as recent
        
        
          polls confirm, many Macedonians believe being part of the former Yugoslav fed-
        
        
          eration were the nation’s best times. This belief, together with the troublesome fifteen years
        
        
          of post-Communist transition, is at the root of the people’s lack of self-confidence, apathy
        
        
          and pessimism. These are exacerbated by the inefficiency of pluralistic governments and a
        
        
          general lack of capable political elites.
        
        
          The “Yugoslav connection” was so strong in the early 1990s that it worked against the
        
        
          election success of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic
        
        
          Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO – DPMNE, hereinafter VMRO), the newly
        
        
          established reincarnation of the legendary, nineteenth-century VMRO. This time it was
        
        
          led by young and charismatic Ljubco Georgievski. VMRO hoped Macedonians would feel
        
        
          a national rebirth when the Yugoslav federation was falling apart and new independent
        
        
          states were emerging. Any political analysis of the center-right political option in Mace-
        
        
          donia must address VMRO and the parties which came from VMRO-DPMNE. This is
        
        
          true even though the party has rarely declared that it belongs to the center right. But it is
        
        
          generally agreed that VMRO represents this political option in Macedonia.
        
        
          After the first success in 1990, when the party won 38 of 120 seats in parliament, Presi-
        
        
          dent Kiro Gligorov refused to give the mandate to the candidate from VMRO-DPMNE
        
        
          to form a government. Instead an expert government was formed, with half of the min-
        
        
          isters close to the party. This government ruled Macedonia for seventeen months and
        
        
          introduced all the laws that would give the Republic of Macedonia the marks of an inde-
        
        
          pendent state. The expert government was dismissed after the leftist parties, supported
        
        
          by VMRO MPs, voted against it. But even while doing this, VMRO had no clear idea
        
        
          where this move would lead the party. This first major mistake was made in September
        
        
          1992 and initiated a long period in opposition that ended only after the victorious 1998
        
        
          parliamentary elections. VMRO’s term lasted until the September 2002 parliamentary
        
        
          elections.
        
        
          This analysis will give some perspective on the rise and fall of VMRO as a governing force
        
        
          during this period and as a major political party representing the center-right option in
        
        
          the Republic of Macedonia.
        
        
          II. The Atmosphere of Change
        
        
          After the expert government was voted down in parliament, power passed to the hands
        
        
          of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), the former Communist Party of
        
        
          Macedonia. SDSM used its rule to strengthen its position in the public administration,
        
        
          security structures and the business sector. Even though its people had been in power for
        
        
          almost fifty years, the six years of its rule after 1992 was used by SDSM to adjust to the new
        
        
          circumstances of parliamentary democracy and also to adjust the system and its institu-
        
        
          tions to work in service of interests allied to SDSM.