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Th e F a i l u r e o f t h e Con s e r vat i v e P r o j e c t…
to understand the complex and occasionally painful structural reforms that were carried
out. On the other hand, conservative politicians have often had a love-hate relationship
with the media. Media criticism is often taken as a declaration of hostilities, with further
relations severed in a torrent of accusations.
Furthermore, the Conservative project was not helped by the public relations policy ad-
opted by Vagnorius: a quiet deal was made with the principal media to eschew criticism of
Vagnorius and his government. Moreover, the government’s public relations efforts were
directed primarily at the increasing the popularity of Vagnorius and his government. Thus
not only were the Conservative Party and the conservative project as a whole left in the
shade, this arrangement also worked against the Conservative parliamentary majority at
whose expense Vagnorius’ popularity rose.
On the other hand, the left-wing opposition was extremely efficient in playing the public-
ity game. Its slogans, though often politically irresponsible and formulated without con-
sideration of the common good (such as branding the privatization of Lithuanian Telecom
as “a sell-out to the foreigners”), nevertheless captured popular and media attention. Thus,
when it came to media battles, Conservatives inevitably lost, adding to their image as a
reckless group serving foreign (i.e., Western) interests at the people’s expense. Most sig-
nificant in this respect is the case of the Mažeikiai Oil Refinery privatization in 1999. The
Conservatives understandably defended the Lithuanian energy market from the prospect
of Russia’s increased control. This was represented, by the left and the media alike, as un-
pardonable squandering of the state assets and fawning to the United States, almost prob-
ably with ulterior egoistic motives. The case of Mažeikiai came to haunt the Conservatives,
especially since Williams International soon defaulted on the obligations it undertook
with the purchase, selling the refinery to the Russian-based Yukos.
Nor were the Conservatives better equipped to deal with the opposition. The latter’s attacks
may have been irresponsible and unconstructive, but the Conservatives did not manage
to outgrow the rules of the game forced on them. Retaliation in kind, parliamentary give-
-and-take, shrill accusations: all of this contributed to undermining the confidence of the
electorate in the conservative project. Even more damagingly, it reinforced the sense of the
futility of the political process as a whole.
Arrogance towards the populace at large outside the immediate circle of party supporters,
especially in the provinces, also contributed to the deepening of political alienation. The
whole political process was thereby perceived as corrupt and ultimately self-interested by
ever-widening circles of Lithuanian society. It is in this alienation and the anti-establish-
ment resentment generated by it that one should search for the roots of radical populism
which would come increasingly to dominate Lithuanian politics in the early 2000s.
Was All Squandered? Positive Aspects of Conservative Rule
It would be wildly inaccurate, however, to describe the four years of conservative rule as
undiluted doom and gloom.
First of all, these years saw decisive progress in terms of Lithuania’s Westward integra-
tion. Negotiations to enter the European Union began in 1999, and membership in NATO
moved nearer, despite the dashed hopes of Lithuanian diplomats and society in 1997, when
