wh y w e l o s t
62
One may register a certain paradigm shift here. Previously, the political debate was largely
defined by such issues as a means for promoting independence and democracy in Lith-
uania, restoring its statehood and integrating it with the West. Towards the end of the
1990s, however, it was the ability to propose solutions to urgent social and economic is-
sues, rather than to offer grand narratives, that defined a successful politician in the eyes of
the public. Likewise, the focus of the concern shifted from foreign to domestic policy.
Even when it came to integration with the West, most
Sąjūdis
politicians who were from
the outset quite uncompromising in voicing their support for Lithuania’s pro-Western ori-
entation and democratic values were shown to have very scant knowledge of howWestern
societies actually operate. In other words, it transpired that many a conservative politi-
cian’s vision of the West lacked foundation in reality. Public proclamations of the Western
ideal at crucial points often failed to connect with the reality of pro-Western Lithuania
that was being created.
The Conservatives were slow to realize that the rousing slogans of the former political
phase no longer represented the real concerns of the society. Instead, there were several
symptomatic attempts to hoist on to the public a preoccupation with ideological concerns
that were entirely
passé
. Thus, for example, the ruling coalition sought to fan a politi-
cal debate around the issue of whether it was legitimate to have sculptures representing
Soviet-era ideological figures displayed in a privately-owned leisure park at Grūtas. The
public merely shrugged off the question as irrelevant.
On the other hand, such newly-emerging issues as growing social and economic dispar-
ity, as well as political alienation between the city and the country, and between the capi-
tal and the provinces hardly received any attention. On the contrary, the Conservatives
frequently adopted a defensive position by insisting on their achievements, whereas any
attempts to point out new problems and challenges were interpreted as implicitly critical
and subversive.
Thus an alternative emerged to the old-style politics in the politicians who had a firmer
grasp of urgent social and economic issues and who could formulate pragmatic solutions
to them. This new paradigm of politicians was represented, for example, in the Liberal
Union: economically competent, ready to propose concrete solutions and youthful (there
were four candidates under 35 among the top eleven on the party’s 2000 election list). It
performed well against the Conservatives, who were perceived as dealing in generalities,
committed to antiquated issues and senile (the association with the Union of the Political
Prisoners and Exiles did not greatly help the Conservative image, either).
The second important aspect of the ideological paradigm shift is that towards the end
of their parliamentary term the Conservatives eventually found themselves without any
distinctive political vision to offer. With their ambitious program of reforms derailed
through internal (societal inertia), as well as external (Russian economic crisis) causes,
and with their government confined to adopting unpopular austerity measures and fight-
ing rearguard action, the Conservatives found themselves outmaneuvered on the ideo-
logical plane. The most innovative idea at the time was one of the Sunrise and Sunset
Commissions, created by Kubilius in order to establish strategic landmarks for business
development and public administration reform. Their activity, however, was drowned in
technicalities and did not have either the expected impact or any broader appeal.
