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V i c tor i e s , D e f e at s , R e c on f i g u r at i on s …
The gradual collapse in public support for the post-Communist governments of 1993-
1997 (Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak between 1993 and 1995, Jozef Oleksy 1995-1996
and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz 1996-1997) was due to several factors. Chief among these
was the slow realization among the electorate that the cumulative effects of their policies
were to restore, if not Communism (which would have been politically impossible), then
at least mechanisms of power which were starting to erode many of the achievements of
the post-1989 democratic changes.
The beginning of the end of post-Communist dominance can probably be traced to the
so-called Oleksy spy scandal of 1995-1996, when the serving Prime Minister Józef Oleksy
was accused by his minister of interior (at that time appointed by then-President Lech
Walesa) of being a KGB spy. The crisis led to Oleksy’s resignation, and an investigation
by the military procurator as well as by parliament, although in the end no charges were
formally laid. Precisely because of the lack of clarity, the Oleksy issue became a feature of
the next election campaign, allowing the opposition to run on a platform that presented
the SLD as traitors to Poland, and Solidarity as the symbol of the national interest. That
was bad news for the SLD, which had achieved its 1993 electoral successes because it
was able to set the electoral agenda around bread-and-butter issues rather than emotional
rhetoric.
In this sense, the 1997 election that brought the right to power was determined not so much
by a short-term struggle between left and right, but a much more long-term debate be-
tween two models of political cleavage. One political cleavage revolved around emotional
perceptions and values, while the other was more reflective of differences between economic
interests, such as the tussle between private and public sector employees, town and coun-
try inhabitants, and the parts of the population which were more and less adaptive to the
demands of the market economy. As the Polish economy develops, and Poland moves closer
to the West, the second cleavage will come increasingly to the fore, and Polish politics will
resemble more and more the classic Western cleavage between left and right. But that will be
a much longer process than many had expected. In the short term, Poles remain politically
oriented according to their historical experience with Communism, regardless of whether
they hold left-wing or right-wing economic views. The Oleksy Case merely strengthened
the importance of that cleavage, and in the 1997 elections the main beneficiaries were those
parties – such as the center right – which tapped into that division.
Unifying the Right and the 1997 Elections
The real stimulus to unity within the right prior to 1997 came from the re-emergence of
the Solidarity trade union as a political force. It proved to be an attractive opportunity
for the myriad of center-right politicians too weak to enter parliament on their own, but
happy to coat-tail on the back of a Solidarity surge. The key to the success of the right
in 1997 was the creation of an appropriate political vehicle, Solidarity Election Action
(AWS), which while not a political party, was an alliance of the Solidarity trade union and
a host of smaller right-of-center parties that agreed to give up some of their autonomy in-
side AWS in return for the opportunity to return to power in the elections. The key figure
in organizing AWS was Marian Krzaklewski, the ambitious leader of the Solidarity trade
union, who also became the leader of AWS itself.
