Why We Lost - page 92

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V i c tor i e s , D e f e at s , R e c on f i g u r at i on s …
as the coalition prime minister, members of the AWS parliamentary club met to review the
agreement. Many were surprised by the degree of compromise that had been reached with
the UW, in particular the number of key ministries that had been ceded to the minority
Freedom Union. In the provinces, AWS activists stiffened their resistance to the appoint-
ment of UW supporters as deputies to AWS
vojvods
(provincial governors), as laid out in
the agreement.
The impression that the coalition was in chaos, and unable to agree on even the most obvi-
ous reform requirements was made worse by the astonishing public-relations lapse of the
government giving its members huge pay bonuses for the last quarter of 1997, even after
it was revealed that the previous Cimoszewicz government had already paid the bonuses
out for its own members. Not only did it look as though as the current ministers were
heading for the trough after only eight weeks in office, it was very untimely since voters
had just been told that they needed to belt-tighten because of the profligacy of the previ-
ous administration.
Factions Muddy the Reforms
The problems of the coalition were compounded for the Buzek government by what
seemed to be a loss of control within the coalition parties themselves, as well as a lack
of media management for the government as a whole. In terms of the first issue, the in-
creasing tensions within the AWS parliamentary caucus over the desired shape of local
government reform revealed a lack of unity and policy coherence. The government was
committed to far-reaching decentralization, as well a consolidation of the cumbersome
system of provincial government, but it quickly became clear that there was no consensus
within AWS on the preferred number of vojvodships, as many activists fought to preserve
their base of power.
Most of the opposition to local government reform within the ruling AWS came from the
National-Catholic faction which considered the consolidation of 49 vojvodships into 12 or
so strong, autonomous vojvodships as a blow to the unity of the Polish state and a surrepti-
tious attempt to ease the transfer of national sovereignty to European Union structures.
While before the elections members were concerned about the ability of the opposition
to block crucial reforms, it now became clear that the biggest threat might be within the
governing coalition itself.
Fissures in the Ruling Coalition over Taxation...
Although local government issues were the most important example of divisions between
AWS and UW, there were others that over the next two years would cumulate in the de-
parture of the UW from the governing coalition. A key area was taxation, a totemic area
of reform for the junior UW partner.
Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz announced in September 1998
his long awaited proposals to introduce a flat tax system in Poland, but it was not long
before Balcerowicz’s proposal came under withering fire. The first to protest was AWS
leader Krzaklewski, who complained that he had not been consulted. More importantly,
Krzaklewski saw that the flat tax would decapitate a keystone of the AWS election plat-
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