wh y w e l o s t
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decided that the only way to survive was to start making their mark in opposition to AWS
ministers, rather than supporting them.
The conflict between powerful Minister of Interior Janusz Tomaszewski, a close associ-
ate of Krzaklewski, and the young conservative head of the prime minister’s chancellery,
Wiesław Walendziak, was symbolic of the conflicts tearing AWS apart. Walendziak ac-
cused Tomaszewski of too quickly “coming to terms” with the existing system of bureau-
cracy and political patronage, rather than seeking to genuinely undertake reforms that
would undercut many of the existing power relationships between government and do-
mestically vested interest groups. In contrast, Tomaszewski felt that Walendziak was leak-
ing information to the press about the suspicions of the public interest ombudsman that
Tomaszewski had concealed his past links with the Communist secret police. Tomaszews-
ki was finally removed from office in September 1999 when the suspicions were formally
tabled against him, and the whole affair caused huge damage to the credibility of AWS and
its leadership, as well as entrenching fault lines and conflicts among its various factions.
Both Buzek and Krzaklewski faced a similar dilemma: to lead from the front, at the ex-
pense of losing supporters on the margins, or to play the role of arbiters and co-ordinators,
focusing on complicated tactics to satisfy all possible factions within party and govern-
ment. For Buzek, the former choice would have meant sacking or reshuffling unpopular
ministers before they became targets for attack; and for Krzaklewski, that would have
meant moving forward quickly to forge a single party from AWS, instead of leaving it
as loose coalition of bickering politicians. In an attempt to buy off short-term stability,
both Buzek and Krzaklewski chose the easier options. The inefficiencies which that choice
produced provoked a vicious circle of declining popularity and increasing dissent in the
ranks, which were becoming increasingly difficult to control.
The Role of the Media
Although the causes of the decline in support for the right were largely a function of its
own internal problems, it cannot be denied that an important extraneous factor was its
failure to control the media, at least in the sense of ensuring fair and balanced reporting.
The key was the National Radio and Television Council, the body that was set up in the
early 1990s to supervise both state and private media, issue licenses for private broadcast-
ers, and ensure that politics did not interfere in radio and television. It soon became clear
that the council first elected in 1993 was unable to prevent national radio and television
from slowly slipping into the political control of the post-Communist SLD. Over the next
few years, programming, especially news programming, became the personal fiefdom of
the SLD, and to a lesser extent, the PSL.
The 1997 elections, and the opportunity to introduce more center-right politicians into the
council on a rotation basis, gave hope that at least a more balanced oversight of the Pol-
ish media might be achieved. AWS representatives on the council negotiated with those
members loyal to the Freedom Union, in the hope that with the aid of PSL members, AWS
and UW might be able to elect a new council chairman, and assert an anti-SLD majority
that could clean house in Polish television and radio. However, the UW put forward its
own candidate (Juliusz Braun) and allowed him to be elected with the votes of SLD and
PSL members, thereby allowing SLD influence in the media to be preserved.
