 
          6
        
        
          The Political Returns of Democratic Governance
        
        
          analytically more subjective. How
        
        
          
            effective
          
        
        
          governance may be is in part
        
        
          bound by the checks and balances of democracy and the outcome may
        
        
          therefore be uneven. How
        
        
          
            efficient
          
        
        
          that process is can also be associated
        
        
          with
        
        
          
            democratic
          
        
        
          governance, but not necessarily so. This is implied
        
        
          in the Chinese bureaucrat’s comment noted earlier. The danger of
        
        
          efficient governance unencumbered by democracy is that it is a short-
        
        
          cut toward the emergence of populist and authoritarian tendencies.
        
        
          And the first to suffer are at the local level – individual voices are not
        
        
          heard, agreed-to mandates are not met, contradictory political and
        
        
          economic priorities are imposed, limited resources are wasted, and
        
        
          corrective local initiatives are smothered.
        
        
          Fukuyama graphs approximations of the
        
        
          
            scope-strength
          
        
        
          matrix and it
        
        
          is useful to visualize; the United States has a less expansive state or
        
        
          public sector role (scope) than Brazil but the quality (strength) of its
        
        
          bureaucracy or public management is perceived as substantially higher
        
        
          than Brazil’s. Both have federal structures, including strong state and
        
        
          local governance institutional roles, so the comparison has some value.
        
        
          A roughly similar measurement might be made of the
        
        
          
            effectiveness-
          
        
        
          
            success
          
        
        
          matrix, which draws on the Mainwaring-Scully analysis.  One
        
        
          can argue that the United States ranks high on the strength of the state
        
        
          scale, which combined with its limited scope, provides it with good
        
        
          odds for success.  On the other hand, effectiveness is a less predictable
        
        
          variable.  Alternatively, Brazil’s relatively weaker state strength limits
        
        
          its success, and the broader scope of its public sector undermines
        
        
          overall effectiveness. The same exercise could be repeated with other
        
        
          Latin American examples.  In an adaptation of Fukuyama’s graphic
        
        
          representation, figures 1 and 2 visualize the relationships of the two
        
        
          matrices.
        
        
          What this analysis only imperfectly addresses is the citizen component
        
        
          of governance. Much of the governance literature is framed as though it
        
        
          is only a derivative of government, less so of citizens.  Yet, in democratic
        
        
          governance the balance of influence or power rests with citizens.
        
        
          Government is constructed by, representative of, and accountable to
        
        
          the needs of its citizens.  This is encapsulated in the IRI operating