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tion. Also, importantly, rather than aiming at far-reaching economic overhaul, the coali-
tion focused on improving the international standing of the country, in which it achieved
remarkable success. It returned the country back to the EU and NATO integration paths,
which gave a sense of dignity to the people that to a certain extent counterbalanced the
unrest caused by structural reforms.
Another reason for setbacks of the center right was the whole range of misgivings related
to
ethical conduct in politics
or public morality in elected office. This was one of the most
disappointing features of the center-right governments: arrogance, corruption and a pred-
atory attitude toward the resources of the state resulted in (and were perceived by public
as) a nearly total failure of parties on the right to establish themselves as an alternative to
their predecessors. This failure was particularly conspicuous in Macedonia, Bulgaria and
Romania, but it also played a role in the Polish, Lithuanian and Hungarian center right’s
reversals, thus raising it almost to the status of a universal factor.
Regarding arrogance, in practically all cases elected officials forgot how and why they
had been elected to office, disappointing and alienating the electorate. Politicians were
seduced by power and emulated their post-Communist predecessors by seeking financial
gain from their positions. The spoils of privatization – or re-privatization, in some cases
– proved to be the downfall of many of the region’s most promising center-right leaders.
The right in Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Macedonia and Poland was not immune to
allegations of privatization-related corruption – accusations that often proved substanti-
ated. Their rule was certainly seen as corrupt by the general public.
In case of Bulgaria, Svetoslav Malinov maintains that the ADF’s failure was not only about
policy-making, but also about moral conduct. The transparency and responsiveness of
government were particularly acute problems in Bulgaria. He argues that ADF failed to
understand that people rioted against the previous government not only out of social dis-
content, but also because they deeply resented its immoral conduct in governing. They
attached high expectations to ADF’s rule as a true alternative also in this respect, and as
soon as the government of the right started to be perceived as “the same as Socialists” on
ethical questions, punishment was not long in coming.
The profound dissatisfaction of ordinary Bulgarians with the moral aspects of the right’s
rule also helps us to understand that in 2001, disillusioned Bulgarians did not turn back to
the Socialists. Instead, they invested their trust in a force that convincingly claimed to be dif-
ferent from both former ruling forces exactly in the area of public morality – the National
Movement Simeon II – and in an unprecedented way. The UDF-based coalition was ousted
from power in 2001 by what was one of the most breathtaking breakthroughs of a new chal-
lenger to power. The highly personalized, anti-establishment and non-ideological National
Movement Simeon II won 47% of the popular vote just two months after its founding.
Also in Lithuania, the failure of the Homeland Union to become a true moral alternative
to its predecessors harmed its chances in a dramatic way. The party fell from a dominant
position to near-outsider status with 8% of the vote. While in power, the Conservatives
– in addition to demonstrating the “normal” corruption and neglect of public interest
– contributed to the rise of populist politics which continue to hamstring Lithuanian po-
litical life today by their incapacity to address and counteract what Adomėnas calls the
“growing rift between society and the political elite.”
