wh y w e l o s t
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Elaboration of the contrasting case of the Slovak right offers an opportunity to use all the
three groups of reasons for the right’s reversals in one analysis. The experience in Slovakia
unequivocally poses the question why the right, despite carrying out economic reforms
and suffering from many of the same vices discussed in this study, was not ousted from
power in the elections in 2002.
One reason which has been mentioned already was that Slovak economic reforms were
not excessively radical, yet they worked. Another reason was the positive impact of the
restoration of the feelings of many Slovaks regarding the country’s international stature.
Yet another reason pertains to the disunited nature of opposition, when Mečiar’s HZDS
lost any coalition potential, its potential ally SNS did not make it to parliament due to an
internal split and the new, ambitious, populist challenger
Smer
turned out to suffer from
unpredictable levels of support. Its actual election result was half of its pre-election poll
results.
The right (KDH and SDKÚ) ran separately, but both of its components obtained solid
results, which, in case of the SDKÚ, was quite a surprise to many. SDKÚ took advantage
of the pending EU accession, appealing successfully as the most reliable guarantor of its
successful completion. This appeal probably worked with a great part of potential center-
right voters who were otherwise estranged by SDKÚ’s performance in power, namely what
they saw as unprincipled pragmatism and allegations of corruption. As with the SOP in
1998, the right pragmatically included a new actor again in 2002: the right-of-center, anti-
establishment party ANO, which liked to present itself as pro-market liberal. In the end,
the rightist character of the coalition was strengthened as its leftist components SDĽ and
SOP failed to enter parliament and SMK, the reliable partner of the pro-reform right, was
included.
Today, the right faces its own disunity caused mainly by differing reactions to the prag-
matism of Prime Minister Dzurinda and his SDKÚ, which in their effort to keep unpopu-
lar government in power have resorted to actions and alliances enraging their coalition
partners, such as various deals with independent deputies in parliament or alleged tacit
cooperation with Mečiar’s HZDS.
Thus the real challenge for Slovak right will be the 2006 elections in which it certainly
will not be a favorite. It will face several options as to how to defend its incumbency. One
of them will be an attempt to reconfigure the political conflict in Slovakia into a form
of “
Smer
versus the rest.” This would assume a highly controversial alliance with and le-
gitimization of the HZDS by its direct membership in the coalition or accepting its tacit
support in parliament (perhaps in the form of an “opposition agreement”) for the sake of
getting the party on the anti-
Smer
side of the conflict. Both SDKÚ and HZDS are using
this idea to exert gentle pressure on their partners, but it is still improbable that it will hap-
pen. Thus, the right’s probable fate in the next election is to be at the mercy of a kingmaker
which will be either HZDS or radical parties such as KSS and SNS.
What remains to be seen is whether the Slovak right will be able to use its renowned com-
munication skills to avoid this scenario. It seems that resources for this are quite limited,
even though there are some signals in polls that the population is starting to perceive and
acknowledge that complex reforms done after 2002 are bearing fruit. But even though
there is a chance of improving the economic performance record of the right, the political
