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E x p l a i n i ng C e n t e r - R i gh t D e f e at s
Macedonia perfectly fits the group of countries where the conduct of politics accounted
for the demise of center-right rule rather than, or greatly in addition to, poor economic
performance. According to our author, the central “ingredient” of VMRO’s failure was
poor public relations and an inability to counter accusations of corruption and miscon-
duct in government. It is, however, necessary to say that this must have been a rather
difficult task, as VMRO soon repeated all the missteps of its predecessors, including cor-
ruption and exploitation of state resources. Moreover, the party also earned the stigma of
(or amplified an already existing) nationalist radicalism. As the Albanian insurgency took
place during its time in government, some of VMRO’s leaders manifested a very harsh
attitude regarding treatment of the insurgents and the Albanian minority in general. This
went hand-in-hand with showing a certain disproval for implementation of some provi-
sions of the Framework Agreement in Macedonia.
The current state of the dominant party on the right, which in the meantime has split,
shows that the Macedonian conservative movement is seriously torn between at least two
factions. One of them relies on moderation, while the other one is clearly basing its poli-
tics on resistance to provisions of the Ohrid agreement and inciting feelings that the Slavic
population of the country is being endangered by the policies of current government.
Another group of problems to be treated under the label of the governing-related causes
is what could be termed
political organization for those in government
, including coalition
government. This can be a problem for center-right parties in two basic ways: either the
right itself prefers various loose arrangements of organization, cooperation and coordina-
tion of forces (“party as a coalition”) over a single party (which may not be possible to
achieve for a number of reasons), or it goes through the troubles of coexistence in coali-
tion with other parties.
Typically, coalitions turned out to be a weak point of center-right rule. As the right is his-
torically more prone to organizational fragmentation, inevitably the victories of the pro-
reform coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe were based largely on coalition-building
strategies. During campaigns, personal and political differences were deemphasized to
present alternatives to the status quo. After elections, however, these differences quickly
reemerged. While it was essential to assemble broad coalitions of democrats to defeat au-
tocrats, these amalgams proved ill-suited to governing. Successful reform and democratic
institutionalization take more than a four-year term, and while more coherent formations
or single parties have a tougher chance of winning a breakthrough election, they are typi-
cally able to govern more effectively.
This was the case mainly in Romania and Poland, both of which illustrate a feature of “par-
ties as coalitions” as a double-edged sword. While the Polish AWS and Romanian CDR were
well placed to win elections, they were poorly structured to govern. On the other hand, the
UDF/ADF seemed to do a much better job of unifying and governing coherently, and the
most diverse government under study (in Slovakia), which was a proper coalition including
one “party as a coalition” (SDK), arguably governed the best. This suggests that fragmenta-
tion as such is not an insurmountable obstacle for successful government, but it can become
so, if coupled with ideological differences and party and personal egotism.
With only a little exaggeration, it can be said that the right in Slovakia not only rose to power,
but practically defined itself through coalition-building – building an opposition coalition,
