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as well as organizing the right itself for electoral struggle in a coalition-like arrangement. The
definition of the right continued in consequent conflicts as to whether to convert this coali-
tion into a large unified rightist party or to continue in coalition practice. These conflicts,
however, never proved to be fatal for the perseverance of the right in power.
The right in Slovakia had to be, and indeed under the shrewd leadership of Prime Minister
Dzurinda, was extremely pragmatic in its relationships with coalition partners, namely
the leftist SDĽ and left-leaning, antiestablishment SOP. This contrasts with the Romanian
case, in which CDR had troubles handling its relationships with PD, or with the Lithu-
anian one, where Christian Democrats decided to distance themselves openly from their
partner in rule, the Homeland Union, in an attempt to save their electoral chances.
The inescapable consequence and a frequent companion of impaired organization for gov-
erning is
political incoherence
which manifests itself in both decision-making (in execu-
tives, as well as legislatures) and policy implementation.
Poland and its AWS represent a complex case in which organizational fragility, fragmen-
tation and lack of political coherence interplayed with ideological insufficiency. In the
case of AWS, its strategy of putting together various rightist groups under one umbrella,
which was so instrumental in accumulating votes, turned out to be a source of weakness
while in power.
Factionalism troubled AWS in terms of organization, policy and ideology. Undisciplined
deputies, a weak prime minister and ineffective leadership were the three main factors
leading to the failure of AWS as an effective structure, as mentioned by Matraszek in his
chapter. All three were inextricably related to fragmentation and a loose coordination
mechanism of the right-wing umbrella.
The fragile and organizationally challenged AWS, a “disparate collection of parties and
grouplets,” as Matraszek puts it, was not able to impose voting discipline on its MPs. Some
members even had perfectly rational motivations to behave as if they were in opposition
to their own leadership. Thus the parliamentary caucus of this political mosaic soon be-
came incapable and unwilling to effectively support the AWS government. By the same
token, it had scant motivation to defend the government and its policies after its popular-
ity declined due to the impact of structural reforms.
The Romanian CDR was also deeply troubled by the paralyzing effect of disunity both
within the Convention itself and within the ruling coalition (the case of PD). For example,
Sebastian Lăzăroiu points out the divisive potential of the “double agenda” of institutional
and economic reform and moral renewal. The right, or better said, some of its important
components, was not able and did not want to give up the “decommunization” agenda,
which estranged allies such as PD and often precluded them from granting support for the
right’s structural reforms. In the end, “decommunization” also produced highly embar-
rassing episodes within the right itself. As anti-Communism is often a defining character-
istic of the right, similar situations certainly represent a predicament for the incumbent
center-right parties implementing reform programs.
Another governance-related feature of the right’s rule, on which the Romanian chapter
does a very good job, is treatment of the established bureaucracies by the center-right
governments after their ascent to power. Lăzăroiu catchingly tackles the topic of how bu-
