Why We Lost - page 56

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Th e F a i l u r e o f t h e Con s e r vat i v e P r o j e c t…
and innovative as well as conceptual thinking. The ambitious program of internal reforms
on which he embarked, though cut short by the Conservative defeat in 2000 and left in-
complete, laid the foundations of Lithuania’s subsequent rapid economic growth. In many
a political analyst’s opinion, Kubilius was the best prime minister Lithuania has ever had,
and he has emerged as the lone voice of reason and responsibility on the increasingly pop-
ulist Lithuanian political scene. His ironic aloofness and intellectual superiority, however,
earns him more the respect of the discerning than the affection of the masses. Currently
he is the chairman of the Conservative Party and, effectively, the leader of the opposition.
III. THE ANATOMY OF THE 1996 VICTORY
Among the conditions that brought about the Conservative electoral success in 1996 one
should mention, first of all, the negative factor: the indefensibly compromised Lithuanian
Democratic Labor Party. Likewise important was the ability of the Conservatives to ex-
ploit its weakness.
In the electoral campaign, the Conservatives offered the electorate the prospect of eco-
nomic progress through private initiative, and of improving life conditions as a result
(“Your Success is Lithuania’s Success,” said one election poster). Their electoral campaign
also employed populist promises (such as compensation of the savings lost through the
devaluation of the
ruble
in the early 1990s) and a call for moral politics (with the “clean
hands” slogan). The campaign was built around criticism of the evident results of LDDP
rule such as the stagnant economy, a lingering sense of impoverishment and multiply-
ing evidence of unchecked corruption. The political dividends of
Sąjūdis’
momentous
achievements also worked to the benefit of the Conservatives.
Sometimes the phenomenon of the “electoral pendulum” is invoked as an explanation of
the Conservative victory in 1996. This is, however, only superficially true. LDDP failures
were objective: the stagnant economy, rampant corruption and a sense of the moral degra-
dation of the ruling ex-Communist regime, as the loyal “thugs” of Prime Minister Adolfas
Šleževičius forced a number of the more intellectual LDDP politicians to the margins, or
even out, of the party.
Other political alternatives were weak. The Center Union had been popular in public opin-
ion surveys, but showed badly in the election, receiving only 12 seats in the parliament.
In the 1996 election, voters were more inclined to choose parties that articulated their
position more clearly along the left-right spectrum, even though they endorsed moderates
(the Center Party) during pre-election surveys.
On the other hand, the somewhat populist promises of the Homeland Union were also an
objective contributing factor. Likewise, there had been no reason so far for distrusting the
“old” politics as exemplified by the two traditional rightist and leftist parties, the Conser-
vatives and the LDDP, as opposed to the “new” politics of the parties untested by power.
This was seen by a large portion of the electorate as the universal remedy in both the 2000
and 2004 elections.
Thus the composition of the 1996 parliament along the principal party lines was the
following: Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) 70 seats (51.1% of seats); the
1...,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55 57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,...154
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