wh y w e l o s t
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Did the Romanian right really lose in 2000? And how and why? There are split opinions
on this matter, which can be summarized as follows:
• The “sacrifice” scenario: Some analysts say that losing power in 2000 was the expected
outcome of a four-year period of harsh and painful economic reforms. People blame
the politicians for short-term consequences, because when they vote they are usually
blind to overarching
raison d’etat
or long-term benefits. Was the support of the Ro-
manian authorities for the US forces’ bombing of Belgrade (against public opinion) a
step forward to gaining later NATO membership? Were the massive lay-offs in mining
regions a first step toward a healthier economy that cut subsidies and closed the “black
holes” of the economy?
• The “incompetence” scenario: Other analysts say that the right-of-center coalition
was not able to understand and manage all the processes of good governance in order
to reach improved macro-economic performance. It could not control inflation, so-
cial unrest, unemployment, bureaucracy, implementation of political decisions, etc.
In this argument, macroeconomic figures are good symptoms of incompetence in
governing matters, and center-right politicians were simply not able to deliver on
what they promised.
• The “high-expectations” scenario: Most analysts believe that during the 1996 electoral
campaign, the CDR could not restrain itself from promising a flood of milk and honey
if it were to win the election. People trusted these promises and formed very high ex-
pectations at the beginning of the governing period (1997). As positive outcomes of re-
form had not appeared at the mid-term and, on the contrary, people found themselves
worse off than three years before, they dramatically lost faith in political leaders and
therefore voted not only for the Social Democrats, but also for the extremist Greater
Romania Party in the 2000 elections.
• The “ex-Communist forces conspiracy:” There were numerous accounts that the
Democratic Convention was not really able to gain the upper hand over the bureau-
cracy and secret services, which maintained a fair amount of autonomy in their deci-
sions and plotted along with the political opposition to undermine the government’s
authority. In January 1999, when a significant group of miners headed to Bucharest
threatening the government with violent protest, law enforcement proved to be weak
in trying to halt the march. Police forces easily retreated in the face of an organized
group of miners, and the prime minister was forced to negotiate a truce with union
leaders.
• The divided-government coalition: For the first time since 1990, the government in-
cluded more than one party. In fact there were so many political parties and civil society
forces represented in the executive branch that any conceivable prime minister could
not have mediated among the divergent political interests. Clashes among governing
parties impeded necessary reforms. Also, as a result and attempt to solve these frictions
three prime ministers were successively appointed (and dismissed) not without danger-
ous fooling around with the constitution.
But it would be completely wrong to think that only one of these explanations accounts
for the electoral failure in 2000. All five scenarios are plausible, since one can find more
than one example to back up each explanation. The five sets of explanations are not even
