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H av e We R e a l l y Lo s t i n R om a n i a ?
prime minister between 1991-1992) and Traian Băsescu (former minister of transporta-
tion from 1990-1992 and 1996-2000, and mayor of Bucharest from 2000-2004). The Truth
and Justice Alliance (DA) was created, but it was probably too late in coming to secure a
visible success in the elections: the DA did not manage to get more votes than the incum-
bent Social Democratic Party (PSD).
The Alliance did succeed, however, in having its candidate, Basescu, elected as president
of Romania. He defeated the PDS candidate, former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, a
very unpopular political figure, who had been accused of corruption and controlling
mass media for his own benefit, but who was a very powerful party bureaucrat and
executive. Năstase was defeated in the second round by a very close margin (51.5%
to 49.5%). This gave an impetus to Băsescu, who, playing a very tough political game,
precluded forming a PDS ruling coalition with the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR)
and UDMR. He talked these parties into coming to support the DA candidate for prime
minister partly by persuasion and partly by threat of new elections. Băsescu took ad-
vantage of the constitutional right of the president to propose the prime minister. Had
parliament rejected his proposal three times, new elections would have been organized,
and small parties like PUR and UDMR faced the danger of not gaining a sufficient per-
centage to make it into parliament. Bluffing or not, Băsescu made a government of DA,
PUR, and UDMR happen.
II. INTRODUCTION
Former President of Romania Emil Constantinescu made a shocking statement just be-
fore he completed his term in office: “I was defeated by former secret police people.” We
are not going to dwell much on what was behind this clear-cut declaration – one that is
quite unusual coming from the president of a country. But the statement itself reveals the
fight of Romanian politicians with the Communist ghosts that has always accompanied
their struggle against poverty, underdevelopment, inflation and all other side effects of
economic reforms that have been initiated in Romania during the last fifteen years. Oc-
cult powers are often comfortable excuses for justifying political failure, giving rise to
the conspiracy theories that have flourished throughout the difficult transition process.
Were there no imagination to explain what happens behind visible events, there would
be no exciting stories to help cover abstract statistical figures about poor performance in
government.
This is not to deny the fact that many former secret police and Communist activists have
tried to gain new positions of influence within the new configuration of power after 1990.
Several studies have evidenced how political power of former Communist decision-mak-
ers was converted into economic and political privileges all around Eastern Europe. How-
ever, assigning a decisive occult influence by such people spread along various institutions
and organizations, as if they had a secret code of action and a common objective to restore
the past regime, is mostly a social and political myth. Such myths, however, are useful as
history is continuously written and re-written. They might divert people’s attention from
the day-to-day facts of life; they are good excuses for politicians who fail to understand
their duties and they keep people aware of past mistakes.
