wh y w e l o s t
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Likewise, governments, while naturally eroding their credibility when in power, have in-
vented various ways to maintain people’s trust in their capacity to fulfill promises.
At least two transfers of power in Romania show that the winner benefited from the high
trust of the population soon after the elections. In Chart 1, one can observe CDR (center-
right) in 1997 and the Social Democratic Party (center-left) in 2000 having scores in public
opinion polls after elections that were much higher than those they had received in the offi-
cial ballot. However, even though many people believed that CDR had created high expecta-
tions after the 1996 elections and this was the reason for such a dramatic failure
1
, it seems
that the high expectations scenario is only partially true. In 2000, PSD tried to better control
voter expectations, but was still invested with a high level of trust just after the elections. It
seems that the PSD did better in using its “parachute” than its right-of-center opponents,
since the party succeeded in preserving its score in the 2004 elections (almost 37%).
There are other differences that we should highlight not only between the two governing
periods (1997-2000 and 2001-2004), but also between the contexts in which CDR and
PSD, respectively, won the elections.
First, while CDR fought hard to take power in 1996, PSD took power almost as a natural
gift in 2000. CDR victory was announced (but not certain) only six months before the
1996 elections. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, were favored in the polls more
than one year before the 2000 elections. Second, whereas the incumbent, right-of-center
coalition entered the 2000 elections profoundly divided (two candidates for president,
two different political entities), the PSD stayed united, even though a fraction had split
in 1997 and tried to create an alternative.
2
Finally, while CDR won the elections in 1996
against a background of relative prosperity and stability, PSD addressed its messages in
2000 to a frustrated, disappointed population plagued by poverty, low consumption and
high inflation.
In order to win the 1996 elections, CDR was almost forced to promise the impossible. Its
Contract with Romania
comprised a list of issues to be solved in only 200 days. These were
very important issues for various categories of Romanians: youth, pensioners, farmers,
blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, etc. Close scrutiny of such promises would have
indicated to rational voters that God himself would have to be involved in the government
in order to have everything solved in 200 days. But voters were so outraged by corruption
scandals involving high government officials reported by the media, that they rationalized
the desire for change by saying, “if only half of these promises are fulfilled, we would still
live much better than now,” or “if these promises come true in 800 days instead of 200 then
we would still doing well in two years.” Experts still think that even this kind of “discount
thinking” regarding the CDR’s program was extremely optimistic.
In 2000, PSD (at that time still PDSR) promised to restore authority and ease the pain result-
ing from the reform process, which of course was not presented as such but mostly as a lack of
1
CDR’s major component, the National Christian Democratic Peasant’s Party (PNTCD), did not pass the thresh-
old for parliamentary representation in 2000 and 2004.
2
This was the Alliance for Romania (ApR) which, however, failed to pass the threshold for parliament, even though
it won almost 10% in the 2000 local elections. ApR located itself within the social-liberal political current and
tried to capitalize on popular discontent toward both right and left.
