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mania, that were not full NATO members at the time, but only partners. It is well known
that after the collapse of the Soviet Union’s security system, Romanians badly wanted to
see their country under the official protection of NATO, that is, to become a member state
in the Alliance. The country’s first attempt in this direction was made in 1997 in Madrid,
when Romania was not invited to join NATO among other Central European countries,
but was promised to be included in the next wave of enlargement, assuming that a set of
conditions were met. Romanians were still optimistic.
However, bombing Belgrade was a rather controversial issue in public opinion. Romanian
authorities decided to support NATO logistically in 1999 in order to threaten the Milošević
regime, while public opinion was more against offering that kind of support. Around 40%
of Bucharest voters believed the authorities took the wrong position in the conflict between
NATO and Milošević, and only 35-37% considered the position correct. This outcome was
all the more significant, given that Bucharest was a stronghold of the Democratic Conven-
tion (CURS survey 1999). A total of 85% of the respondents in the same survey wanted the
attack on Belgrade to cease as soon as possible, and 64% thought that bombing Belgrade
was just an act of NATO aggression towards another country. Throughout the rest of the
country, the opposition was even stronger – 76% of adult Romanians opposed Romania’s
logistical support of the NATO bombing of Belgrade (POB, May 1999).
This opposition was derived from the feelings of Romanians that they should not contrib-
ute to aggression against a neighbor. Moreover this particular neighboring country shared
the same Orthodox religion, and bombing Belgrade had not stopped even on Easter. The
Social Democrats, in the opposition at that time, opposed the bombing and the offer of
logistical support to NATO. Of course, they capitalized on popular discontent about the
bombing of Belgrade and the government decision to support NATO. Three years later,
Romania became a full member of NATO, under the Social Democratic-led government,
and Social Democrats in power decided to send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. Social
Democrats themselves wanted to be “the artisans” of NATO integration, although many
analysts considered that had Romania decided not to support NATO in 1999, it would not
have become a full member in 2002.
Another illustrative example is linked to the fate of mining regions. For several years after
1990, the restructuring of mining enterprises was considered a hot potato for any govern-
ment. In fact, one needed much courage to take on the issue. Subsidies granted to state-
owned mines had become a serious burden to the budget, and the cost per unit of Roma-
nian coal was said to exceed the price of imported coal. The only reason not to close down
some of the inefficient mines was concern for the miners themselves and their families.
The critical mining region was Valea Jiului (in the Southwest of the country), because
mining was the dominant economic activity in the region and therefore the main source
of income for households. Other auxiliary activities developed around mining enterprises,
which meant that closing down the mines would lead to massive unemployment of the
population and to poverty. Mining unions had proven to be the strongest labor organiza-
tions in the country after 1990, and the Petre Roman cabinet was actually dismissed by
the miners in 1991, when it attempted to start restructuring the mining area. Miners came
to Bucharest in a violent protest and forced the government to resign, with the support of
some conservative figures of the ex-Communist party at that time.
