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H av e We R e a l l y Lo s t i n R om a n i a ?
competence on the part of the center-right government, disregard for the poor majority and
in-fighting among coalition members. Basically, the PSD promised only to heal the wounds
and nothing more, but what followed the election exceeded the people’s expectations.
Still, there was one more difference in communicating with the public. While the CDR
government exposed the public to all crises, setbacks, and in-fighting, with the media
enjoying each and every political scandal, PSD had developed a strategy to manage public
exposure by controlling the media from the very beginning. It was said that the media had
actually defeated the left in 1996 by criticizing the government and promoting the right-
of-center coalition. After having lost the 1996 elections, left-wing political leaders admit-
ted that they should have been friendlier with the media so as to build a more positive
public image. Many expected the PSD not to repeat the same mistake during 2001-2004,
and indeed it did not. But instead of developing a friendly relationship with newspapers
and TV stations, the PSD preferred to control information flows by manipulating the me-
dia’s market constraints and opportunities
3
.
Finally, the electoral basis for right-of-center parties was rather narrow and still is. Ur-
ban, educated, young professionals from Western regions and Bucharest mostly vote for
the center right, as they hope to fulfill their entrepreneurial aspirations, while poor, old
people from rural area and the poorest regions of the country vote PSD and center left
(considered the heirs of the Communist party), as they need more assistance from the
government. The majority of voters falls into the second category, due to the difficulties
of the transition process and the collapse of the Communist would-be welfare regime.
However, the center-right coalition proceeded to undertake tough economic reforms in
the urban industrial sector (including privatization and closing-down of state enterprises)
and thereby alienated a good share of its traditional voters. This means that the electoral
base of the CDR had gotten even narrower by 2000.
IV. Wrong Causes for Good Consequences
Sometimes in history, what seems to be wrong at a given moment is a cause for a positive
event later on. Is this because what seemed to be wrong was actually right? Or is it because
the positive event was only perceived negatively? The question is hard to answer, but there
are least two major examples to illustrate how some “negative” actions of the center-right
government between 1996-2000 lead to some “positive” consequences right after the 2000
elections. Needless to say, all these “negative” actions played a role in CDR losing popular
support after four years in power.
The first example is a classic illustration of how to govern against public opinion, but for
higher reasons. In April 1999, NATO decided to take action against the Milošević dicta-
torship in Serbia to stop the massacre of Albanians in Kosovo. Taking action, in this case,
involved using armed force to crush the symbolic institutions of the Milošević dictator-
ship. The bombing of Belgrade required support from neighboring states, including Ro-
3
Most media outlets had accumulated debts to the state budget and expected the new government to forgive these
debts. PSDhad closed its eyes, suggesting favorable behavior toward government actions. Selling government or
state company advertising to media was also an act of distributing privileges to the most obedient.
