Why We Lost - page 53

wh y w e l o s t
52
I. INTRODUCTION
W
hen the Lithuanian Conservatives swept into power in 1996, there were few
signs to indicate the coming patch of economic, political and social instability
they would face, the ascent of populism that would emerge and the ordeal the
Conservatives themselves would suffer at the hands of the electorate – all of this in the
course of barely four years.
The Conservative comeback, when it happened, elicited sighs of relief among liberal and
right-of-center political commentators alike. “End of the Lithuanian Syndrome?” won-
dered one. The “syndrome” referred to the return to power of the post-Communist parties
throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the trend that began with the
1992 Lithuanian election.
In 1996, a Conservative-led coalition secured control of 87 seats in the 137-seat
Seimas
(parliament) of Lithuania. The coalition, consisting of the Homeland Union (Lithuanian
Conservatives, 70 seats), Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (16 seats), and the Union
of Lithuanian Political Prisoners and Exiles (1 seat), showed all the promise of becom-
ing a new force that would redraw the Lithuanian political map in a way that Margaret
Thatcher’s Tories had reshaped the British political climate in the previous decade. Cer-
tainly, neither ambition, nor ability, nor political will and commitment were lacking when
Gediminas Vagnorius formed his government after a landslide in October 1996.
It took only four years, however, and following the 2000 parliamentary election the Lithu-
anian Conservatives had to make do with barely nine seats, while their former coalition
partners, the Christian Democratic party, split and demoralized, captured only two. The
resulting fractions of the Christian Democrats went on, alternately, either to be gobbled
up by other parties, or to dwindle to a ghost-like presence, remaining merely a municipal-
level force. The Union of Lithuanian Political Prisoners and Exiles, facing political extinc-
tion, eventually merged with the Homeland Union.
This chapter will tell the tale of the decline of what initially seemed to constitute a highly
promising beginning, a chance for Lithuania and a trend-setting reversal in the fortunes
of center-right forces throughout Eastern Europe. Inevitably, given the subject, the present
paper will give greater focus to the failures and negative aspects of conservative rule. I will
try, however, briefly to do justice to the positive aspects of the conservative coalition rule
towards the end of the chapter.
1
II. PRE-HISTORY OF CONSERVATIVE RULE
AND DRAMATIS PERSONAE
A short historical excursus is in order here. The first parliamentary election in Lithuania
in 1992 ended in a surprise defeat for the popular movement
Sąjūdis
(which in Lithuanian
means just that: “the Movement”) which had previously led the country to the Declara-
1
I am indebted to thoughtful analyses by Kęstutis Škiudas, Vladimiras Laučius and Dalius Stancikas, as well as to
kind assistance by Jovita Pranevičiūtė.
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