wh y w e l o s t
46
To illustrate this point, two inexperienced, but well-known former Olympic champions
commonly assumed to be supporters of the left, Pál Schmitt and Zoltán Pokorni, were
chosen to be vice presidents at the congress in May 2003. A number of well-known, but
unpopular politicians were pushed into the background, while previously lesser known
ones were given a chance. Orbán, returning to lead the party, guaranteed continuity in
its general direction and carried out the sometimes contentious changes while relying on
the strength of his personal authority. His leadership, although a uniting force for right-
ist voters, was still unacceptable for many other voters. To attract these voters, Orbán
himself had to change. In an effort to soften his rhetoric, emotional elements faded from
his speeches, as did the value-centered messages sent out to rightist voters. They were re-
placed by materialistic questions that interested the entire voting population like inflation,
taxes, unemployment, etc.
Almost a year after converting to a union, during his American-style annual speech addressing
the nation, Orbán spoke directly to the leftist voters and “absolved” those who did not stand up
against the Communist dictatorship because of a desire to protect the welfare of their families.
16
Though Fidesz has emphasized that it was not against the average man but rather the Commu-
nist elite, this message had been successfully obscured by the opponents’ propaganda.
Mobilization
Fidesz concluded that one of the reasons for its 2002 defeat was a weak mobilization effort.
Though the moderate campaign was a part of the strategy, leaders of Fidesz realized that
the delay in party building seriously limited its mobilization efforts. The restructuring dis-
cussed above stemmed from this realization. Elections to the European Parliament (EP)
provided a good opportunity to test the new system.
Fidesz also initiated an ambitious program, called the National Petition, which was mar-
keted as a questionnaire that was targeted at the average Hungarian voter. The National
Petition, initiated on 27 March 2004, included five demands for the government. These
included that the price of medicine be reduced, subsidies for the farmers be increased,
home-building support introduced by the civic government be restored, the process of
privatization be halted and a cap on the annual increase in the price of gas and energy at
5% be imposed. During the next month activists of the Union appeared in every major
city and reached almost every village in an attempt to collect one million signatures. On
15 May 2004, Orbán and Pokorni announced the achievement of this goal.
Activities featuring direct democracy were complemented and supported by the tools of
parliamentary action. Fidesz put forth a motion in parliament, and at the beginning of
June 2004 a bill was presented that dealt with the issues addressed in the National Petition.
Although the governing majority refused to discuss the bill, the demands of the National
16
“Many are those in Hungary today who believe to have lived a safer and even better life in the previous regime.
They feel uneasy and even anxious when they see some rejecting the Socialist era – including those, who, so to
say, made certain compromises, although they just tried tomake some sort of a living, tried to be happy and tried
to provide a safe life for themselves and their loved ones. If we want to have the fears relating to the past evaporate
frompublic life, it is up to us, the younger ones who have made the regime change to show the elder ones that we
understand them and their lives.” Viktor Orbán, Ocotober 2004.
