Why We Lost - page 17

wh y w e l o s t
16
one) argued that primaries were inappropriate for European politics. All the nay-sayers
were right in one respect: unsuccessful primaries would expose the opposition to ridicule
and sow the seeds of its total collapse.
Together with the parties and a Bulgarian non-governmental organization called the Cen-
ter for Liberal Strategies, IRI formed a working group to discuss the details and prepare
the text of a general agreement among all sides in the process. The group included inde-
pendent experts, representatives of the presidency and all of the opposition political par-
ties in the parliament. The final document was signed on 29 March by Ivan Kostov (UDF),
Anastasia Moser (PU), Stefan Savov (PU) and the representative of the Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (MRF), Ahmed Dogan. Later the agreement was signed by the two
contenders, President Zhelev and the UDF candidate Petar Stoyanov. The first two clauses
of the document stated that an accord had been reached to “nominate a joint candidate
for the presidential elections in Bulgaria through the process of primary elections” and
“to support the nominee who wins the primaries and not to nominate or support other
candidates in the presidential elections.”
The first presidential primaries in Bulgaria took place on Saturday, 1 June 1996. The turn-
out was 858,560, with voters facing a choice between President Zhelev and the younger
UDF candidate Stoyanov. There were no incidents during the process. On 4 June, it was
clear that Zhelev had lost by a two-to-one ratio to the younger contender. Stoyanov be-
came the official joint candidate of all democratic parties in Bulgaria for the coming presi-
dential elections in October. He went on to win the “real” elections with a record-breaking
margin of 20% in the second round against the candidate of the BSP. Six months later, a
newly formed coalition called the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) won early parliamen-
tary elections.
The presidential primaries were a turning point in the course of the Bulgarian transition
to democracy and a market economy. Undoubtedly they remain as an excellent example
of what the Bulgarian center-right parties could achieve through political dialogue and
cooperation in spite of internal fights and conflicts. But while the center-right parties
were overcoming the crisis within their own ranks, the BSP government was dragging the
whole country into the worst economic crises since the liberation of Bulgaria from the
Ottoman Empire in 1878.
III. The Failure of the Socialist
Government (1995-1996)
After 1995, an avalanche of problems and crises overwhelmed the government. Yet, as
early as the middle of 1995, experts were warning that the methods being applied to the
nation’s economy were in fact an attempt to revive the centrally planned economy and, as
such, were doomed to result in catastrophe. Nevertheless, the dimensions of the collapse,
when it came, took almost everyone by surprise.
The grain crisis came first. Business groups close to the prime minister exported grain
in enormous quantities, substantially exceeding the legal export quota, which seriously
disturbed the grain balance of the country and put the population’s provisions in danger.
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