wh y w e l o s t
24
lic confidence back only by addressing the entire electorate. In designing its policy, the
Union should have opened up to independent experts and opinion-makers who cared
about UDF’s problems and could suggest new ideas. The intellectual potential of the UDF
electorate was extremely high, but this potential was not used appropriately by the party
leadership. The time in opposition was invaluable for establishing permanent contacts
with influential and active representatives of civil society in Bulgaria. The professional
and entrepreneurial communities undoubtedly understood the essence of the reforms and
were the natural civic allies of the “blue party.” The UDF had to find a way of communicat-
ing and developing long-standing mutual commitments with them.
The UDF had to make an effort to develop its Christian democratic identity in order to
take principled and consistent positions in the public debate, especially in opposition to
the government of NMSII and MRF. Thus its initiatives would not spring from
ad hoc
circumstances or the personal whims of one leader or another, but rather from clearly
articulated principles. They would generate the value-oriented policy which was missing
during the ADF government. The UDF sought to clean up its image by using those values
in real policies at the national and local levels.
By democratizing the party, opening it up to all Bulgarian citizens, stressing Christian
democratic values in UDF policies recruiting new people at the national and local levels
UDF could restore its public image. These processes redefined the character of the party.
But this term in opposition could be UDF’s last chance to become a genuine political party
and to provide categorical guarantees that its members and its leaders have learned the
lessons of 2001.
After twelve years of painful transition to democracy and market economy, the UDF has
become a symbol of change for the Bulgarians. Irrespective of the letdowns and mistakes,
the Union remained
the
reformist force in Bulgaria. The UDF had to rely on this part of its
identity, for which it was loved and hated and in the name of which the Bulgarian public
chose to follow it in 1997. It should have always supported and defended the achievements
of the “blue” government (1997-2001) and Prime Minister Ivan Kostov.
The UDF had to recognize clearly that anti-Communism could no longer be the ideologi-
cal pillar of the organization, even though many members and supporters were united by
this principle only. This does not mean that the first twelve years must be crossed out, or
that UDF policies were misdirected. Nor does this mean that anti-Communism should
be abandoned altogether. But the agenda of anti-Communism has been exhausted, and
the credit for this went precisely to UDF. In this sense, the UDF emerged as an anti-Com-
munist formation whose policies were directed at eliminating its own
raison d’etre.
The re-
forms which the UDF uncompromisingly backed and conducted put an end to the large-
scale anti-Communist project in which all countries in transition were involved. Similarly,
the ideas which the UDF declared at the beginning of transition, and which were met with
furious resistance at the time, have been embraced by all political formations in Bulgaria.
This victory in the battle of ideas meant that the first decade of Bulgarian modernization
had ended with the adoption of the reformist agenda by all.
It is very probable that in the next stage, all the parties that rely mainly on anti-Commu-
nist rhetoric, as well as those pining for a return to Communism, will be marginalized.
The UDF’s mission in opposition was to formulate the agenda of the “second-generation”
