wh y w e l o s t
26
The obvious favorite in the presidential elections in November 2001 was incumbent
President Stoyanov. His reelection seemed inevitable when the BSP nominated its leader,
Georgi Purvanov, as its presidential candidate. Purvanov’s popularity was falling fast after
the defeat of the BSP in the parliamentary elections, and many observers considered this
nomination a dignified way for the BSP leader to step out of office. Stoyanov, in turn, de-
cided to run as an independent candidate, believing that active campaigning for him by
the UDF leadership and members might do more harm than good. Stoyanov was a strong
supporter of the idea of collaboration between UDF and NMSII. Distancing himself from
UDF, the president demonstrated his sympathy for NMSII by officially asking for its sup-
port. On the eve of the elections, this support was given by new Prime Minister Simeon
Saxe-Coburgotski, who called upon NMSII voters to support Stoyanov.
The actions of President Stoyanov were considered unacceptable by many traditional UDF
voters. That negative judgment was combined with a very confusing campaign burdened
by a very late start and personal blunders on behalf of the president. The result was a real
shock: after the first round, Stoyanov came in second behind Parvanov and was unable
to change anything during the two weeks preceding the second round. For the first time
since the beginning of the transition, a BSP candidate won the presidential race. The So-
cialists received a boost from this win and for the first time since 1996, their party took
the lead in the polls.
The National Conference of UDF was characterized by a very depressing atmosphere.
Only one year earlier, the president, prime minister and mayor of the capital city were
members of UDF. By March 2002, all this was gone. Ekaterina Mihaylova was replaced
as leader of UDF by ex-Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihaylova, who was considered a
figure of compromise within the party. She supported the “hardliner” attitude towards the
government, but had excellent personal relations with representatives of the “collabora-
tionist” wing. It was hoped her achievements in foreign policy could transfer her personal
popularity to the party itself.
It became clear after the National Conference that radical changes in the UDF would have
to be postponed indefinitely. The top leadership of the party (i.e. the National Executive
Council, consisting of twelve members) was indeed renewed, but all governing bodies
beneath it remained untouched. The desire to balance between the various internal groups
of the party and the unwillingness (or maybe the inability) to confront the government on
a day-to-day basis gradually deprived the UDF of its identity as a viable opposition force.
Rumors about a coalition with “the king” continued, and the critique against the “hardlin-
ers” never stopped.
The new leadership lapsed into passivity and inertia. One year after the election of Na-
dezhda Mihaylova, there was a widespread feeling that UDF was fading away. Instead of
becoming a stepping-stone for the success in the parliamentary elections, it was feared by
party activists that the local elections in the autumn of 2003 would be a debacle for the
party. Mihaylova, aware of these fears, made the courageous move to run against Stefan
Sofianski for mayor of Sofia. During the campaign, she declared that she would either
win the race or resign as leader of UDF in the hope that her personal ultimatum would
mobilize the “blue voters” of the capital. The results were disastrous both for UDF and its
leader. The Union received only 370,000 votes in comparison with 850,000 in 2001. This
