Why We Lost - page 26

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R i s e , F a l l a nd D i s i n t e g r at i on…
reforms of Bulgarian society. If the UDF were successful in presenting such a political
vision to the Bulgarian public, it would also preserve the center-right project as a modern-
izing and reformist government alternative. Thus the Bulgarian center right would be able
to restore its
raison d’etre
and would become a guarantor of reforms in Bulgaria, both past
and future.
In the short run, all the temptations within the UDF to “help” the inexperienced NMSII in
exchange for the reward of preserving certain positions in government should have been
ignored. The party should have remained in opposition and exposed the lies of NMSII and
its leader. It should have occasionally played the role of the constructive opposition, the al-
ternative vision for the government that would defend the idea of Euroatlantic integration.
The re-election of President Petar Stoyanov, the symbol the new beginning of 1997, should
have been considered a crucial first step in the recovery of UDF. The local elections in the
autumn of 2003 were supposed to be the “dress-rehearsal” for the next parliamentary elec-
tion. In the local elections, the Union was expected to restore its reputation and strength
by showing its new face to the public. Good results could have erased the negative events
that culminated in June 2001 and given the UDF the chance to reclaim the right to govern
the country again in June 2005.
VII. WHAT HAS HAPPENED (2001 – 2004)
After the 2001 election, the leader of UDF, Ivan Kostov, took full responsibility for the elec-
toral defeat and immediately resigned. He also resigned from all positions within the party,
becoming a regular member of the parliament and refraining from public speaking for al-
most two years. He was replaced in the end of June 2001 by Ekaterina Mihaylova – the leader
of the “blue majority” in the previous parliament. She was supposed to lead the party to the
13
th
National Conference in March 2002 where elections for all governing bodies of UDF
were expected to be carried out. The eight months of her leadership were very eventful.
Under Mihaylova’s leadership, UDF decided not to go in the coalition with NMSII and to
stay in opposition. Instead of uniting the party, this move caused a deep division among
the party members and leaders. The “hardliners” were represented by Ekaterina Mihailova
and Ivan Kostov, the alternative vision was expressed by Phillip Dimitrov, prime minister
from 1991 to 1992, and Stefan Sofianski, the UDF mayor of Sofia since 1995. Even before
the parliamentary elections, they openly defended the idea of collaboration with Simeon
Saxe-Coburgotski and NMSII. The question of cooperation with NMSII and its leader
created a new dividing line within UDF. This was the reason for Sofianski’s leaving UDF in
the autumn and founding the Union of Free Democrats (UFD).
These controversies made it impossible to realize the project of reforms that the new leader
of UDF proposed. Personnel changes were limited to the exclusion fromUDF of the highly
compromised figure of Deputy Prime Minister Yevgeny Bakardjiev (1997-1999), who was
the leader of the Sofia branch of the party. Radical changes in the structure of the UDF and
the introduction of new procedures for the selection of candidates for parliamentary and
local elections were left for the National Conference in March 2002. Unfortunately before
the end of 2001, UDF suffered another heavy blow.
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