wh y w e l o s t
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But the ADF did not meet this expectation. In fact, it failed completely in this respect. Its
task was not only to conduct a concrete policy and to implement its program, but also to
build and maintain a sense of solidarity between the government and the governed based
on a common belief in the necessity of the painful and long-overdue reforms. But solidar-
ity, an important value of Christian democracy, was interpreted in the narrow partisan
sense as something applicable only to relations between the supporters and members of
UDF. In this context, the government itself started to look unjust, and the moral creden-
tials of the power-holders came to be seen as questionable.
Bulgarians did not want to hear about achievements because the moral profile of the
power-holders became more important than everything else. Thus a pragmatic debate on
competence, means and ends in policy-making was displaced by a debate on morality and
ethics in politics. On this battlefield, the ADF could never win. It was not the painful re-
forms and the severe financial discipline that caused the enormous decline of public trust,
but the repulsive image of the party politicians and the UDF itself.
The Party
Shortly before the early elections in April 1997, a momentous decision was taken at the
UDF Ninth National Conference. Following years of debate, UDF leaders decided that the
Union should become a single party instead of remaining a loose alliance of more than a
dozen bodies, most of them with tiny memberships. The UDF’s transformation from an
amorphous, anti-Communist coalition into a party in 1997 was an undeniable success. It
was the main guarantee of a successful, four-year term in office, especially after the bitter
experience of the early 1990s, when maintaining the integrity of the Union and its parlia-
mentary group proved to be an impossible task. There was little nostalgia for the early days
of the “UDF movement” with their the lack of discipline, chaotic meetings of the National
Coordinating Council, contradictory statements of leaders, tortuous decision-making and
inability to enforce decisions once they were made. The UDF as a party was undoubtedly
built with the clear design of ending the organizational chaos of the early 1990s. From this
perspective, the project of building the UDF produced the desired results.
On the other hand, any analysis of the election loss must note the “closing up” of the UDF,
not only to the Bulgarian public at large, but also to its own supporters. Clientelism, en-
capsulation, poor personnel policy, transformation into a sect-like party – these are the
most frequent descriptions of the processes which evolved while the ADF was in power.
It turned out that the new, orderly structure generated poor intra-party communication.
Information flow between the UDF local clubs and the central leadership was difficult.
Rank-and-file members were left with a sense of isolation fromUDF policy-making which
led to their disillusionment. Many stopped delivering UDF messages to the public.
Within the party, there was also a fusion of administrative and political power that caused
its encapsulation, as most UDF local leaders were also members of parliament. The MPs,
who held positions on both power levels, had to communicate within the limits of party
structures. The bulk of the information and communication about the problems of the re-
spective constituencies passed through a specific partisan filter which selectively selected
out only the problems of UDF activists. And when UDF deputies visibly concentrated on
solving the problems of UDF members, it was very hard for external observers to accept
