Why We Lost - page 20

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R i s e , F a l l a nd D i s i n t e g r at i on…
In the area of defense, Bulgaria emerged as one of NATO’s most impressive participants
in the Partnership for Peace joint-forces exercises, working hand-in-hand with the United
States Department of Defense on a top-to-bottom military reform program. Bulgaria also
was active in the Euroatlantic Partnership Council. Very quickly Bulgaria became one of
the great success stories of the world’s emerging markets and a leading candidate for the
next round of NATO expansion.
From its first day, the government actively pursued membership in Western institutions,
including NATO and the European Union. The ADF maintained close contacts and an
active dialogue with NATO and EU officials on all relevant political, financial and military
issues related to its future membership. In many ways, the Bulgarian government attempt-
ed to cooperate as though it were already a full NATO member, as witnessed during the
Kosovo crisis. The government believed that active engagement to fulfill the membership
criteria would encourage foreign investment and promote greater confidence in Bulgaria’s
political and economic institutions.
To sum up the essence of the ADF government, there is no doubt it was the most success-
ful government since the start of transition in 1989. Bulgaria overcame the severe crisis it
was going through and, by introducing a currency board arrangement, achieved financial
stabilization and low inflation throughout the ADF’s term in office. In the context of this
stable macro-framework, the government conducted structural reform and privatization,
as a result of which the private sector began to dominate the Bulgarian economy. Foreign
investments grew to a record high in the year 2000. Bulgaria set clear priorities in for-
eign policy, which were supported by the majority of the Bulgarian public. The desire and
consistent work for integration with the European Union and NATO achieved concrete
results and dispelled all doubt about “Bulgaria’s path” for the next generation. The Kostov
government became the first in the post-Communist era to complete its term in office.
It weathered several external economic storms and received international praise for the
example it set as a zone of stability in the volatile region of Southeastern Europe.
Objectively speaking, the government’s economic and political achievements seemed like
more than enough for reelection or, at worst, for a minimal loss. However, in the par-
liamentary elections in June 2001 the ruling coalition was overwhelmed by the newly
formed National Movement Simeon II (NMSII). Its leader was the exiled successor to the
Bulgarian throne, Simeon Saxe-Coburgotski, who became the next prime minister. It was
no consolation that the old enemy BSP was in an even worse situation, finishing in third
place for the first time since 1989.
V. THE REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT IN JUNE 2001
Bulgaria’s parliamentary elections in June 2001 can aptly be described by the word “land-
slide.” The elections were characterized by a “shift in the political strata” or even as a “col-
lapse of the political base.”
Part of the explanation is provided by the peculiar characteristics of NMSII and its leader.
The rise of NMSII as a political force was so meteoric that the leaders of Bulgaria’s tra-
ditional parties, as well as political experts and observers, still cannot truly diagnosis its
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