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R i s e , F a l l a nd D i s i n t e g r at i on…
such practices. All Bulgarians had to question who the UDF’s MPs really served – ordi-
nary citizens or only UDF members.
Paradoxically, the ADF’s sweeping victory in the April 1997 parliamentary elections trig-
gered negative tendencies within the party. The UDF parliamentary group was numerous
enough to manage an absolute majority of seats in the chamber. This cleared the way
to a government completely dominated by the UDF and to mass appointments in pub-
lic administration and local government. In early 1997, the economic resources under
state management were formidable, since the BSP government had blocked the privatiza-
tion process. The UDF came to power with the promise of accelerating privatization. The
promise was kept, but the way this was done largely undermined public confidence in the
party. The image of the UDF among the Bulgarian public was irreparably marred.
The UDF became too involved in the privatization process. It can be argued that politically
motivated lending of public resources and political reallocation of property constituted a
reasonable alternative in an economic system that was defenseless against the encroach-
ment of capital of unclear origins or outright “dirty money” from notorious “businessper-
sons.” But it is also quite understandable that the ultimate result of such an approach was
a host of accusations of clientelism and corruption against those in power.
The UDF, however, did not allow or, more precisely, did not try to find a way of allowing
broader sections of the public to take part in the privatization process. The process, crucial
for the formation of new social relations, was thus reduced to an intra-party reallocation of
public property. Before the eyes of the Bulgarian public, and with the collaboration of UDF
government-appointed civil servants, the members of UDF local structures and the central
governing bodies took part in joint business ventures. This symbiosis of political and eco-
nomic activity operated within the legal framework. But no one should be surprised that it
fed a burning feeling of injustice and promoted the perception of large-scale corruption.
The authentic political debate within the rank and file of the UDF was displaced by the
issue of allocation and reallocation of economic resources, which naturally dominated the
reform agenda. The value-oriented policy required by the Christian democratic identity
disappeared from the domestic political image of the UDF and was manifested only in the
field of foreign policy.
Thus, before the 2001 elections, any basis for arguments and campaigning in terms of gov-
ernment policy effectiveness, competence and achievements, was largely destroyed by the
dirty image of “the blue party,” as the UDF came to be known. The public refused to make
its choice by taking part in such a debate. The majority put its trust in something else which,
albeit beyond the sphere of real politics, was promised them by the NMSII and its leader.
There was no way to counter this phenomenon, since cleaning up the image of the UDF, built
during the term in power, needed much more than several weeks of election campaigning. It
could be argued that a four-year stint in opposition was what was needed for this task.
VI. WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE (2001 - 2005)
In the long run, UDF had to open itself up to the public. When the party was in opposi-
tion and the overwhelming majority of the public did not support it, it could win pub-
