21
R i s e , F a l l a nd D i s i n t e g r at i on…
The government was forced to launch severely delayed reforms in several spheres – public
administration, health care, education, the armed forces, etc. While these reforms gradu-
ally gathered momentum, they inevitably triggered acute social discontent, and there was
reluctance among the population to recognize their necessity. The introduction of new
legal frameworks for a number of traditional social and economic relations led to dra-
matic social protests – for example after the introduction of compulsory electronic cash
registers for retailers. Reforms took their toll on particular social groups or professional
communities before their positive results could be felt. The ADF government’s reforms
were extensive and, more often than not, citizens felt some negative effects from the so-
called “unpopular measures.”
It seems there was a definite pattern to the ruling center-right coalition’s loss of popular-
ity. A similar pattern was seen across Eastern Europe, in which almost all center-right
governments failed to win a second term in office. If the center right in the ex-Communist
countries follows its reformist program unswervingly, it must inevitably pursue unpopu-
lar policies which often alienate voters. In most cases, they will turn to the renewed left,
although the electorate might also support nationalist political groupings. Hence the logi-
cal conclusion is that in the conditions of transition, center-right governments will “fall
victim to the success of their own policies” because, weighed down by their daily cares,
people cannot see things in the long term and therefore can hardly appreciate reforms that
will take time to yield tangible positive results.
Although this explanation is quite popular among the politicians of the center right, it
contains only part of the truth. As numerous opinion polls showed, the Bulgarian public
by an overwhelming majority accepted the need for reforms and the fact that they had
been delayed. Bulgarians supported – or at least understood – the inevitability of reform,
but they rejected the tactics and the agents of its implementation.
The ADF government failed to do something very important, something that people ex-
pected, but was not articulated clearly in the enthusiasm of the civil unrest during the
winter of 1996-1997. Perhaps ADF failed to recognize that the unprecedented intimacy
between the general public and the opposition created remarkable expectations. The in-
volvement in civic protests and the intensity of the support provided by the protestors
exceeded the routine duties of the democratic citizen who occasionally goes to the ballot
box to cast his or her vote. This created excessive expectations with regard to the nature of
the new government.
“We terminated the BSP’s rule together, we will build a new Bulgaria together” was the
commitment written in the election manifesto of the ADF. Bulgarians expected a return
to the reformist agenda and a new policy that would break the nostalgia for Communism
once and for all. Bulgarians were longing for a new style, a new manner and a new way
of policy-making. They expected the closest possible relationship between government
and the governed, and they expected openness, direct and frank dialogue between the
authorities and the public – mechanisms and practices which were entirely alien to the
Communist regime and which were also absent during the BSP government. After the
extraordinary effort that went into bringing about early elections, the majority of Bulgar-
ians expected that this would at long last be truly “their” government – transparent, com-
municative and sincere.
