Why We Lost - page 21

wh y w e l o s t
20
cause. Although the NMSII was immediately identified as a populist movement, making
use of the disappointment in the traditional parties, there was no time to neutralize the
effect of the messages of Simeon, who announced his intentions to run only ten weeks
before election day.
NMSII is not considered a member of the Bulgarian center right. Moreover, NMSII rep-
resentatives – probably,
inter alia
, under the influence of their leader – are not inclined
to identify themselves ideologically in left-right terms. The emphasis in their self-identi-
fication is invariably on “pragmatism, expertise and positive attitude.” They claim to be a
centrist formation with an intense concern for social issues. The party joined the liberal
faction in the European Parliament. However, the purpose of this essay demands that we
focus not on the winner but on the loser – UDF.
Four years after this political landslide, public debate on this subject may be summarized
as following: If one reason had to be singled out for UDF’s disastrous results in the 17 June
2001 elections, it would certainly be associated with their attempt to simultaneously solve
two major problems, each one of which would normally require a party’s entire political
will, devotion and human resources. In the period from 1997-2001, the UDF had to con-
tinue its transformation from an anti-Communist coalition movement into a united party,
while also governing the state.
The difficulty of solving both problems at the same time stemmed from the UDF’s insuf-
ficient preparedness for taking over government in 1997. The Union was in the process
of internal reformation, the end of which was envisioned to coincide with the end of the
government’s term in office in 1999. But the fall of the BSP government upset the rhythm
of Bulgarian political life; the opposition had to take responsibility for the country’s gov-
ernment irrespective of its internal state and available resources.
Hence the reasons for the loss of confidence in the right (namely in the UDF) in power
may be divided into two groups. The first one includes all those associated with govern-
ment, and the second, those associated with the state of the UDF as a party. Even though
this division is partly superficial, as the UDF was the ruling party, it is nevertheless most
expedient for the sake of analysis of the election defeat of what was viewed as a quite suc-
cessful government.
The Government
The presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996-1997 refocused the attention of Bul-
garian society on the abandoned reformist agenda. For the fulfillment of those tasks, the
Bulgarian political system could rely only on the ADF coalition, dominated by the “blue
party” – the UDF.
In spite of the various policy successes of the UDF government, its rule saw rising un-
employment that stabilized at 20%. In the context of the currency board arrangement,
income policy was bound to observe strict fiscal discipline. Wages and salaries in the pub-
licly-financed sphere rose steadily, but the low starting point from 1997 and their slow
increase did not satisfy the population. Although the living standard of the citizenry rose
consistently, the majority of citizens felt insecure, poor and pessimistic about the pros-
pects for improvement.
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