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Wh y F i d e s z Lo s t : A S u c c e s s f u l Go v e r nm e n t…
sive marketing campaign that highlighted the massive resources that were invested into
the state through the Széchenyi Plan
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. MSzP campaign strategists immediately attacked
the prime minister, but Orbán kept his promise and stayed busy with governing instead
of campaigning. By not responding to the accusations, the core of the right’s voters was
incensed and increased its activity, while the undecided voters felt that the silence of the
prime minister betrayed his guilt. MSzP voters simply had their views reinforced.
The success of the MSzP campaign, which began in 2001, was built on the simple concept
of creating a local network based on interpersonal connections that emphasized fieldwork
by party activists. The MSzP ran a campaign which stressed an active presence in the
streets. It also utilized the media and direct-marketing tools to maximize mobilization.
The MSzP’s use of foreign techniques for the campaign greatly contributed to its success.
Sticks and Carrots
While Fidesz declined to run a negative campaign, the MSzP entrusted the preparations for
the 2002 parliamentary elections to Ron Werber, an Israeli campaign advisor. He had pre-
viously conducted several successful campaigns of the left in Eastern Europe and in Israel
and gave considerable help in planning and arranging the negative campaign, as confirmed
afterwards by several directors of the Socialist campaign (Baja-Tóbiás-Szigetvári, 2003,
page 1302).The campaign kept the government’s corruption cases on the agenda, while the
smaller opposition party, SzDSz, criticized the constitutionality of the government.
Whereas the SzDSz used an exclusively negative campaign, it was the MSzP’s task to commu-
nicate the positive messages. The MSzP had two choices; one was to criticize the government’s
achievements in economic and social policies, and the other was to acknowledge the cabinet’s
efforts and promise even more. The MSzP clearly knew that voters were focused on economic
issues. Voters were satisfied with the cabinet’s economic policy and were optimistic about the
future, although not to the extent suggested by the government’s advertisements. So they opted
for the second option. Their message acknowledged that the economy was doing relatively
well, but claimed a corruption-free cabinet could manage the state better. They promised the
people more support, stating in their manifesto that “Hungary Deserves More!”
When comparing the electoral promises of Fidesz and the MSzP, it is clear that the MSzP
outbid its rival in every way. The MSzP declared that it would continue without any chang-
es and expand the programs granted by the previous government. One of the differences
between the two parties was that where the manifesto of Fidesz promised an increase in
the support for developing sectors of the economy, the MSzP guaranteed money for the
direct consumption of the population without having to work for it. These promises were
meant to be delivered within the first hundred days of government.
The Defeat
Fidesz, despite its misguided campaign strategy, was shoulder-to-shoulder with the So-
cialists until the eve of the elections. The last opinion polls before the elections suggested
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To emphasize this, Orbán declared that, contrary to the usual practice, the government would keepworking even
during the campaign. Orbán himself, upon whom the entire campaign was built, thus excluded himself from
daily political battles and started his campaign only three weeks before the elections.
