wh y w e l o s t
44
that Fidesz would have a comfortable victory, securing more than half of the parliamen-
tary mandates and thus forming the government with its partner, the MDF. This mistake
was not only methodological, but also due to the mobilizing force of the MSzP’s campaign
structure. While exit polls estimated a 68-70% turnout, relatively high for a Hungarian
election, it actually turned out to be 4-6% higher. It was exceptionally high in Budapest
and the industrial towns, the strongholds of the MSzP.
The directors of the Socialist campaign used the British model as a guide for the MSzP’s
mobilizing system (
See
Baja-Tóbiás-Szigetvári, “One Step Ahead of Our Rivals,” in: Kur-
tán-Sándor-Vass (eds)
Political Yearbook of Hungary 2002
, Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások
Magyar Központja Alapítvány Baja-Tóbiás-Szigetvári, 2003, pages 1294-1297). The system
mobilized large masses of politically inactive citizens over a period of a year and a half. A
further issue was that in previous elections, turnout was lower than what was suggested by
the exit-poll data, thus hampering the ability of pollsters to predict the outcome.
Fidesz lost the first round of elections by a couple of thousand votes, but it did not give
up the battle. The party changed its strategy in less than a day and during the short two
weeks between the two rounds, Fidesz carried out an effective campaign against the left
which resulted in a victory in the second round, although one that was not sufficient to
change the final outcome of the elections. This clearly illustrated what kind of a result
Fidesz might have achieved had it not stuck so rigidly to a purely positive campaign.
The new government formed a Socialist-liberal coalition under the leadership of Prime
Minister Péter Medgyessy.
IV. More than a Change of Strategy,
less than an Ideology
Ever since 1998, Fidesz has battled the Socialists’ accusations of politicizing and polarizing
Hungarian society. Around the 2002 elections and the period that followed them, the accusa-
tions became so prevalent that a majority of Hungarian voters considered it to be a matter of
fact that Fidesz was “the divider.” This cleavage, however, tied rightist voter’s loyalty to Fidesz.
This was vital for a party which had its support boosted from five to 40% within a few days’
time in 1998. In other words, if Fidesz wished to turn its group of sympathizers into a stable
and broad base of supporters, it needed to forge emotional ties and create a distinct identity.
The political conflicts and electoral battles Fidesz faced helped develop an intense emo-
tional attachment between its politicians and the supporters that was unique to Hungarian
politics. This connection was not shattered by the defeat in 2002, but instead the unity and
esprit de corps
of the civic voters became stronger
Movement for Stabilization - Expanding to Become a Union
The primary aim of Fidesz in 2002 was to institutionalize these emotional ties. The first
task was to create the “civic circles movement.” Two weeks after the defeat, between the
two rounds of elections, many unregistered rightist organizations were formed. The defin-
ing features of these civic circles were their opposition to post-Communism, engagement
