27
R i s e , F a l l a nd D i s i n t e g r at i on…
represented a loss of almost 60% of the votes in the middle of its opposition term. Mihay-
lova came in third after Stefan Sofianski and the BSP candidate. Between the first and the
second round, UDF leaders suffered the humiliation of asking “blue voters” to support
Sofianski, the leader of the new UFD party. Although the BSP candidate lost the race, the
victory of Sofianski was another indication that UDF was loosing even its hardcore voters
in the capital.
The dissatisfaction with the state of the Union was articulated openly by many local and
national leaders. The situation deteriorated rapidly when the leadership of UDF down-
played the situation and Mihaylova refused to resign despite her earlier declarations. The
tensions within the party grew rapidly, and the two factions within the party became clear-
er in the public eye. They differed in their assessment of the government of ADF, their
attitude towards the NMSII and their vision for the coalition policies of UDF.
The “hardliners” within the UDF demanded an unconditional defense of the previous
“blue government,” relentless opposition activity against the NMSII-MRF government and
rejection of any future coalition prospects with NMSII. They accused NMSII of turning
back the reforms of the state administration, of rehabilitating the repressive institutions of
the totalitarian past and of open collaboration with BSP. They insisted on coalitions only
with organizations that are in strong opposition to the government and under no condi-
tions with NMSII. The “collaborationists” were far more critical of the “blue government”
–Mihaylova even apologized to the Bulgarian public for its mistakes. They were more
tolerant towards the NMSII, planning future collaboration or even coalition with it
.
It
became obvious that UDF
consisted of two entities that cherished different perceptions
of the past, the present and the future of the Union. These differences were too deep for a
peaceful coexistence.
After the failures of UDF there was tremendous public pressure on Ivan Kostov to return
to active politics. In the meantime, instead of making personal changes or trying to reach a
compromise with the “hardliners,” UDF leaders decided to call an extraordinary National
Conference to consolidate their power before the parliamentary elections in June 2005.
Many local branches of the organization openly expressed their disagreement and the
parliamentary group was divided, as well.
In March 2004, UDF suffered the most painful split in its history. Numerous members of
the party left, including Ivan Kostov, leader of UDF in 1995-2001 and prime minister in
1997-2001; Ekaterina Mihaylova, leader of the majority in parliament in 1997-2001 and
UDF chairwoman in 2001-2002; Yordan Sokolov, parliamentary speaker in 1997-2001;
and the majority of ministers of the previous ADF government. The parliamentary group
was split two-to-one in favor of the “hardliners.” In May 2005, a new party was founded
– Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB), and Ivan Kostov became its leader.
Thus the Bulgarian center right entered the 2005 elections divided into three. UDF re-
newed the Allied Democratic Forces coalition with its partners the Democratic Party
(DP), the Georgyovden Movement (GM) and the Bulgarian Agricultural Popular Union-
United (BAPU-U). The mayor of Sofia, Stefan Sofianski, succeeded in forming a coali-
tion called the Bulgarian Popular Union (BPU) that included his own party, the Union of
Free Democrats (UFD), the Bulgarian Agricultural Popular Union (BAPU) and the small,
nationalistic International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO). The third
