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Wh y F i d e s z Lo s t : A S u c c e s s f u l Go v e r nm e n t…
relied upon if and when they lost power. Orders by the state were a part of the tools to
build such a realm of influence, allowing companies close to the right to expand party-
patronage to the state’s enterprises. Apart from controlled “investments” by the state, Fi-
desz made efforts to co-opt the right-of-center intelligentsia by creating or sponsoring
numerous foundations and non-profit companies, as well as trying to place its supporters
in the directorates of existing social organizations. Both attempts were partially success-
ful. Fidesz successfully increased its influence in state-owned banks and big companies,
but there was no time to build up an entire economic network. Moreover, it was a bitter
disappointment for voters to see Fidesz participating in the same type of behavior that had
driven the Socialists out of power, especially since voters had expectations that the new
government (particularly Fidesz) would seek to correct the corruption of the past.
The MSzP quickly discovered the effectiveness of this issue and focused on keeping as
many corruption cases on the docket as possible as elections approached. Attacks were
almost exclusively aimed at the prime minister and his closest advisors, suggesting that he
abused his mandate for personal financial gain.
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The opposition stressed the corruption scandals of the government rather than any policy
failures, and this tactic tainted every government decision with the suspicion of corrup-
tion. It may be said that the right did not lose the fight against corruption but only the
debate about it (
See
Csizmadia, Ervin, “Parties and Corruption as Thematization in 2000,”
in: Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds)
Political Yearbook of Hungary 2000
, Budapest: Demokrácia
Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2001).
While one of the main points of the Fidesz manifesto in 1998 was about protecting na-
tional assets, it constituted only a small component the 2002 electoral program. Fidesz
realized in 1998 that regime change and democracy meant more than reforms carried out
in certain institutions and believed that it should involve a reaffirmation of ethical and
moral standards. System change is not just a change in methods but the process of restor-
ing justice. Cases of corruption between 1998 and 2002 weakened Fidesz’s position and
suggested that new elite was growing rich behind the scenes of democratic institutions.
The Gate-Keepers
The influence of the media on Hungarian politics has grown in recent years. To understand
the position of the press in Hungary, it is necessary to analyze the distinctly Hungarian char-
acteristics which set it apart from the press in other nations. As opposed to Western prac-
tice, the Hungarian media work under strict party control. This is evident in the structure
of ownership, as well as in the strong interrelationship between the media elite and party
politicians. These two groups have never been separated in Hungary, and both print and
electronic media are subject to the rules of politics. This is also true for the public and the
commercial media, meaning that a given medium’s political persuasion has a direct effect
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Themost unjustifiable of these attacks was one on the primeminister’s father. According to the opposition, Orbán
allegedly ordered a state company to present a sub-contract offer for his father’s mines. Though the allegations
were never proven to be true, the opposition’s strategy was successful, and by the end of the term all surveys
showed the highest corruption perception to be clearly attached to Fidesz amongst parliamentary parties. Source:
