wh y w e l o s t
        
        
          36
        
        
          II. More than a Change of Government,
        
        
          Less than a Regime Change
        
        
          The Fidesz-led coalition offered an alternative to the voters by redefining the state, society,
        
        
          the individual and the communities, with an interpretation opposed to the old post-Com-
        
        
          munist set of values. The revaluation of old terms and institutions resulted in conflicts (
        
        
          See
        
        
          Lánczi, András,
        
        
          Utopia as Tradition
        
        
          . Budapest: Attraktor, 2005). This approach departed
        
        
          from the previous government’s propensity to avoid conflict through political maneuver-
        
        
          ing and cautious policymaking. But this willingness to enter into conflicts was a phenom-
        
        
          enon for which the Hungarian voter was not prepared.
        
        
          The civic government’s view of politics and its rhetoric redefined the relations between
        
        
          the individual and politics. Whereas the Socialist government did not count on citizen
        
        
          participation and saw politics as the job of the elite, the civic government encouraged the
        
        
          people to take part in politics, to form an opinion about public matters and to engage in
        
        
          organizing the life of their communities. This meant that voters had to take responsibility
        
        
          for forming the political community. At the same time, this new concept of responsibility
        
        
          meant that the state no longer wished to support the citizen as such, but instead his or
        
        
          her ambitions. The ambitious citizen was of utmost importance, and official government
        
        
          rhetoric suggested that the state would support all initiatives that enriched the religious
        
        
          and sports communities, the family, the township, the nation, etc. Thus the civic govern-
        
        
          ment’s vision of the future was built on strong ties between the state and its citizens, where
        
        
          engaged people, accepting the communities’ goals, enjoyed support from the state.
        
        
          Emphasizing the community was an important element of the government’s policy goals.
        
        
          Consequently, with the nation being the topmost overarching category of the organic hierar-
        
        
          chy, fostering a national sense of community was also an important part of these initiatives.
        
        
          Since national cohesion was seriously damaged through the repression and internationalist
        
        
          ideology of the Communist era, the center-right government attempted to reinforce and
        
        
          rebuild national ties. Through various symbolic acts, such as moving the holy crown to the
        
        
          parliament building, rebuilding the national theater (which had been demolished during
        
        
          Communism) and staging a spectacular millennial celebration of Hungarian statehood, the
        
        
          government sought to strengthen a sense of national unity throughout Hungary.
        
        
          To clarify these principles of civic government, below we will discuss the ways in which
        
        
          the government implemented these ideas while pointing out the factors that hindered
        
        
          their full implementation.
        
        
          
            Experiences in Party Government
          
        
        
          Fidesz had worked with no more than twenty MPs since 1990, and following the fiasco
        
        
          in 1994 the party structure was drastically cut back because of financial constraints. Thus
        
        
          after the 1998 elections only few people from the narrow leadership possessed the capac-
        
        
          ity and experience to manage the 148 MPs and the party itself. After 1998, the so called
        
        
          “coach and six,” the core around Prime Minister Orbán which included all the influential
        
        
          politicians of Fidesz, provided direction to the party. Besides strategy-making, the duty of
        
        
          the “coach and six” was to harmonize the work of the party, the parliamentary group and