Why We Lost - page 40

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Wh y F i d e s z Lo s t : A S u c c e s s f u l Go v e r nm e n t…
of employed workers in the country – a drastic change from the 75% decrease in the real
value of the minimum wage during the previous government.
10
The rise in employment,
income and wages accompanied a considerable decrease of inflation.
While the Széchenyi Plan was representative of the cabinet’s economic policy, the family
was the focus of its social policy. The family unit was a major beneficiary of the govern-
ment’s redistributive policies and a tool to further the goal of building a stronger nation
built on community. In terms of practical policymaking, this meant broadening social-
cohesion systems, tax benefits and the aforementioned home-building credit-program.
Besides restoring social benefits cut by the Socialist government, the center-right cabinet
preferred to grant tax breaks in order to benefit middle-class families.
These government policies constitute only a small part of four years of work, but they help
to demonstrate the difference between the Socialist cabinet’s neo-liberal policy and the
concept of a deliberate increase in the role of the state.
Attempting to pinpoint which groups of society the government’s measures were
aimed at, we could highlight (1) the employed members of the active age group with
expertise or financial resources who live in families and (2) those wanting to be part
of this group. While the first group is generally considered to be the “middle class,” in
the civic in the rhetoric of Fidesz, the second was open to everyone willing to make
the effort needed.
III. The Downfall
Facing Post-Communism
The center-right government’s primary goal was to bring the transition from Communism
to its conclusion. The title of Fidesz’s electoral campaign and manifesto, “The Future Has
Started” reflected this goal. This slogan reflected two themes: the beginning of a long-
awaited and more prosperous future and the end of post-Communism. Fidesz thought
that the post-Communist and the civic virtues had conflicted with one another in the past,
while the new policy of the center-right government was to expunge the post-Communist
set of values and start anew. “The forces of the future have lined up,” said Orbán to the
party congress preceding the elections on 16 February 2002.
Fidesz faced several obstacles in this task. First of all, creating a new set of values with an
implicit rejection of post-Communism would appear radical. As mentioned above, one
of the most remarkable characteristics of the 1998 elections was the intensity of political
conflict. But parochial Hungarian voters, traditionally adverse to conflict, considered this
inappropriate behavior. Even many right-of-center voters did not understand that devel-
oping a new set of values would involve a certain degree of conflict.
The left attempted to portray the right, primarily Fidesz, as war-mongers. Consolidation
of civic virtues and the continued attempts to replace the post-Communist political struc-
10
Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 2003: KSH 2004, p.96.
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