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Wh y F i d e s z Lo s t : A S u c c e s s f u l Go v e r nm e n t…
Failure of the Post-Communist Government - Downfall
of the Neo-Liberal Policy
The governing parties were unprepared for this rapid consolidation of the political right,
and their reaction was inadequate. The campaign slogan of the Gyula Horn cabinet in
1998 suggested that there was only one political force capable of governing the country.
This message might have been true a year before the elections, but certainly not in the
spring of 1998, since by then voters recognized a real governing alternative in the coalition
led by Fidesz.
The socialist-liberal government of 1994-1998 was portrayed by the opposition as “a trust-
eeship to bankruptcy.” A one-sided monetarist view seemed to dominate the government’s
program, pushing all other aspects of governing into the background. They considered it
their main job to maintain Hungary’s solvency and creditability, but they neglected to ad-
dress the delayed effects which devastated certain segments of the society. The restrictive
stabilizing package of 1995, introduced with the International Monetary Fund’s approval,
was aimed at decreasing the deficit. But several aspects of the package proved to be un-
constitutional. Incomes fell by 20%; many health-care services ceased to be free; family
benefits were reduced; and university tuition fees were introduced, as were many more
other unpopular measures. During the four years of the Horn government, the value of
knowledge was disregarded, with serious cuts in cultural and educational funding. The
whole of the government’s work can be best described as short-sighted pragmatism. A lack
of long-term planning characterized the second half of the term.
As in other Eastern European countries, the issue of privatization created a severe conflict
in society. Privatization was accompanied by several scandals, most famous of which was
the so-called Tocsik-gate, which indicated a link between privatization-related corrup-
tion and MSzP. It was suspected that money from privatization was transformed into the
MSzP’s and the SzDSz’s election campaigns. This shook the governing parties’ popularity,
while allowing Fidesz to reap the political benefits.
The Promise of New Politics
The decreasing living standard raised dissatisfaction with the government, but gave the
center-right parties only a limited advantage. As the elections drew closer, the MSzP kept
its lead. But it was the poor performance of its smaller coalition party, the Free Democrats,
which would cause the downfall of the left. Fidesz had to face the reality of the remarkable
structural advantage of the Socialists. This advantage rested in their strong ties with the
press, business, trade unions and former party cadres turned plutocrats, as well as a dense
social network of supporters.
Besides relying on its narrow base of supporters in their 20’s and 30’s, Fidesz focused on
the elder, conservative rightists, the liberals of the coalition partner MDF and undecid-
ed voters. While the MSzP aligned the old, Communist-era petty bourgeoisie and those
privileged by the Communist regime, Fidesz formed a group of new property owners, civil
servants, young intellectuals and those who grew up before the Communist regime.
This heterogeneous group of constituents needed a program with both moderate conser-
vative and liberal elements in it. It was a group whose members had lost their political
