35
Wh y F i d e s z Lo s t : A S u c c e s s f u l Go v e r nm e n t…
1. benefits to be provided to families and those raising children,
2. stopping privatization and reconsidering which assets were to be kept as state property,
3. re-emphasizing culture and education, and
4. a “law and order” package that included harsher punishments, a focus on drug viola-
tions and improvement in the efficiency of criminal investigations.
The Victory of the Center-Right Alliance in 1998
The center-right alliance led by Fidesz vigorously supported an increased role for the state.
This was welcomed by voters from the Socialist era, who were seeking help from the state
to soften the blow of a rapidly falling living standard. In identifying the reasons for the
Fidesz victory, many analysts stressed the rhetorical skills of the party’s candidates, as well
as its use of imported political communication techniques. This notwithstanding, it can
argued that the cause of the party’s success was its new concept of the state
1
. By rejecting
neo-liberal and technocratic policies and stressing the increased scope of the state, the
right could initiate discourse in the areas where the incumbent government previously
deprived itself of this opportunity.
The Socialist government’s central theme – that there was no viable alternative to its rule
– was based on the mistaken assumption that the integration of the right would be slow
and thus no opposition would have the votes to win a majority. In fact, the situation was
such that the rise of an attractive alternative was much faster than anticipated. Conse-
quently, the Socialists could only increase their popularity at the expense of their coalition
partner, the Free Democrats. Thus the left’s expectation of a weakened and divided right
seriously compromised its electoral chances.
This miscalculation weakened the ruling government’s strategy in other ways, as well. If
there were no alternative to the left, a moderate campaign would be sufficient and disci-
plined leftist sympathizers would still go to the polls without arousing the passions of the
right with radical campaign rhetoric. But this assumption proved to be incorrect, as op-
position voters were already being sufficiently mobilized by the right without any need for
a catalyst from the government’s campaign.
All these mistakes and the unexpected unity of the right secured success in both rounds of
elections in May 1998. The elections had a low turnout (that of the first and second rounds
being 56.26% and 57.01% respectively).
Right-of-center parties effectively used the method of reciprocal withdrawal of candi-
dates in the second round, enabling them to win mandates in their individual constitu-
encies. Based on theses results, Fidesz Chairman Orbán was appointed
formateur
of the
government. Coalition talks with MDF and FKgP were concluded on 6 July 1998. Two
days later, Orbán’s government was backed by a large coalition composed of Fidesz, FKgP
and MDF.
1
Avar János: The Old Coon and the Young Tiger,
Magyar Hírlap,
21 May 1998.
