wh y w e l o s t
34
identity after the regime change (
See
Csizmadia, Ervin, “The Interpretation of the 1998
Elections,” in Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds)
Political Yearbook of Hungary 1999
, Budapest:
Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 1999). Their faith in a change of
regime was gone, but not their lust for political activity. Fidesz tried to reach these disillu-
sioned voters and shift their allegiance to the political right. The slogan of Fidesz in 1998,
“The Future’s Choice,” meant that the
civil
(or
civic
) idea was in fact a breakaway from the
political practice and values of the post-Communist elite.
Preparing for Governance
Several conditions were in place to improve the public’s trust in government. The lead-
ers of Fidesz were all in their thirties in 1998. The party’s candidate for prime minis-
ter turned 35 shortly after the elections, and there were also younger leaders within the
party. Most of them held a university degree, came from the lower-middle class and took
no part in the state-party Communist Youth Organization. Consequently, their careers
were not guided by the Communist elite, but rather the result of their own effort, courage
and talent. Fidesz was also the only party in the parliament which had not yet been in a
governing position. It was untouched by corruption scandals and could play the role of
the “new hope.”
Fidesz also effectively used new symbols and a new language to accentuate its trust-
worthiness. In contrast to the technocratic jargon witnessed in the declining years of
governing Communist politicians, Fidesz chose a simpler language, avoiding foreign
words and using language that appealed to the average voter. This helped support the
image of Fidesz as a party which cared for the people’s problems. The “civic” attribute,
which was added to the party’s name in 1995, reinforced this and symbolized the values
of the center right. The word became a tool to unite the large number of uncertain and
disillusioned voters (
See
Csizmadia, 1999). Fidesz was on good terms with its potential
voters, and the party took good care not to clarify the term “civic” or construct a clear
conservative idea around it to avoid pushing away liberals or voters with a weak attach-
ment to the right.
Fidesz gave up using sharp anti-Communist rhetoric, for fear this might mobilize the
post-Communists or scared away swing voters. “Civic” or “civil” (
polgári
in Hungarian)
had a different meaning for different voters, without its various interpretations being
opposed to one another. This included preserving social security and the lifestyle of the
Western European middle class, the rejection of Communism and post-Communism and
an emphasis on Christian values. Though socialist intellectuals did their best criticize its
ambiguity, the term was successful.
Fidesz learned from the defeat of the 1990-1994 government. The party avoided pre-
senting an ideological program to the Hungarian voters, in part because the diversity of
its supporters impelled it to do so. Party strategists knew that once in power, a quickly
implemented policy program would make the right’s new politics credible for the con-
stituents.
In order to do this, Fidesz presented a program consisting of forty points, divided into
several parts:
